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SECURING FINANCIAL XML TRANSACTIONS USING 
INTELLIGENT FUZZY CLASSIFICATION METHODS 
 
By 
 
Faisal Tawfiq Ammari 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Keywords: XML, financial transactions, fuzzy logic, fuzzy XML, XML 
security, XML encryption, financial transactions, banking 
 
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) has been widely adopted in many financial 
institutions in their daily transactions; this adoption was due to the flexible nature of 
XML providing a common syntax for systems messaging in general and in financial 
messaging in specific. Excessive use of XML in financial transactions messaging 
created an aligned interest in security protocols integrated into XML solutions in order 
to protect exchanged XML messages in an efficient yet powerful mechanism.  
However, financial institutions (i.e. banks) perform large volume of transactions on 
daily basis which require securing XML messages on large scale. Securing large 
volume of messages will result performance and resource issues. Therefore, an 
approach is needed to secure specified portions of an XML document, syntax and 
processing rules for representing secured parts. 
 
In this research we have developed a smart approach for securing financial XML 
transactions using effective and intelligent fuzzy classification techniques. Our 
approach defines the process of classifying XML content using a set of fuzzy variables. 
Upon fuzzy classification phase, a unique value is assigned to a defined attribute named 
"Importance Level". Assigned value indicates the data sensitivity for each XML tag.  
 
This thesis also defines the process of securing classified financial XML message 
content by performing element-wise XML encryption on selected parts defined in fuzzy 
classification phase. Element-wise encryption is performed using symmetric encryption 
using AES algorithm with different key sizes. Key size of 128-bit is being used on tags 
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classified with "Medium" importance level; a key size of 256-bit is being used on tags 
classified with "High" importance level.     
An implementation has been performed on a real-life environment using online banking 
system in Jordan Ahli Bank one of the leading banks in Jordan to demonstrate its 
flexibility, feasibility, and efficiency. Our experimental results of the system verified 
tangible enhancements in encryption efficiency, processing-time reduction, and 
resulting XML message sizes. 
 
Finally, our proposed system was designed, developed, and evaluated using a live data 
extracted from an internet banking service in one of the leading banks in Jordan. The 
results obtained from our experiments are promising, showing that our model can 
provide an effective yet resilient support for financial systems to secure exchanged 
financial XML messages. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray, Paoli, Sperberg-McQueen, Maler, & 
Yergeau, 2008) has been widely adopted in many financial institutions in their daily 
transactions; this adoption has been due to the flexible nature of XML in providing a 
common syntax for systems messaging in general and for financial messaging in 
particular. Excessive use of XML in financial transactions messaging has created an 
aligned interest in security protocols integrated into XML solutions in order to protect 
exchanged XML messages by using an efficient yet powerful mechanism. There have 
been several approaches proposed by researchers to secure XML messages and there is 
a comprehensive collection of related works.  
 
XML is designed based on text format and has a tree structure. It is natural that data 
integrity, data authentication, information confidentiality, and other security benefits 
 19 
should be applied to entire XML data or portions of XML data. XML security solutions 
should provide a high level of security to ensure the confidentiality of information 
represented using the XML format. XML security must be integrated with XML data 
features and characteristics to keep the flexible nature of XML while integrating 
essential security technologies. 
Due to the sensitive nature of financial transactions that use XML as their main 
messaging protocol, a security requirement should be fulfilled to protect exchanged 
XML messages by using a dynamic and efficient mechanism. The security mechanism 
should encrypt portions of XML data rather than whole messages, e.g. element-wise 
encryption should be used to protect sensitive parts within the XML message. 
The specifications related to XML security published by W3C define the basic 
framework and rules that can be utilized across applications. The basic idea for XML 
security is to perform data encryption on XML messages whereby XML data 
confidentiality is achieved to ensure that the XML data structure, data content, and 
other sensitive information in XML data may only be accessed by legitimate parties. 
Confidentiality is generally associated with encryption mechanisms or access control 
technologies. XML key management (Hallam-Baker & Mysore, 2005) provides the 
basic key requirements for XML data confidentiality . 
 
However, on a daily basis, financial institutions (i.e. banks) perform large volumes of 
transactions that require XML encryption on a large scale. Encrypting large volumes of 
messages in full will result in performance and resource issues. Therefore, an approach 
is needed to encrypt defined parts within the XML document, to identify syntax for 
representing encrypted portions, and to identify the processing rules for decrypting 
those portions. W3C XML encryption has a feature called element-wise encryption, 
 20 
which is the process of encrypting parts of an XML document. The encryption process 
can be applied to more than one element in a given XML document; each is contained 
in another element. The element might enclose sub-elements, attributes, texts, or a mix 
of all mentioned items. The remaining parts of the document should remain intact as 
plaintext. 
To avoid any performance or resource issues, a mechanism should be considered to 
choose which parts of the XML document should be encrypted on the fly, whereby the 
parts are selected based on smart criteria for detecting sensitive information within an 
XML document . 
The fuzzy logic (FL) (L.A. Zadeh, 1965) approach can be used to distinguish sensitive 
parts within each XML document. FL provides an easy way to reach to a definite 
conclusion based upon noisy, vague, imprecise, ambiguous, or missing information. 
FL's approach for controlling problems imitates how a person would make a quick 
decision. FL includes a rule-based ‗IF X AND Y, THEN Z‘ approach for solving a 
control problem, rather than attempting to design a system in mathematical way. The 
FL model is relying on an operator‘s experience rather than their technical 
understanding of the system. 
The FL approach is quantified based on a combination of historical data and expert 
input. FL has been used in many fields especially in computer information systems, and 
computer science to combine expert input with computer models for a large scale of 
applications. The main advantage of the fuzzy approach is that it can process 
imprecisely defined variables and variables which mathematical relationships cannot 
define their corresponding relationships. FL has the ability to integrate expert human 
knowledge and judgement to define the variables and corresponding relationships. By 
integrating expert human judgement we get more realistic model (Mahant, 2004) 
 21 
 
1.2 Research Motivation 
Many businesses and financial institutions use XML in their basic transaction 
messaging, due to its flexible nature and structure. A solid security approach is required 
to ensure safe and trustworthy transactions either within the same institution or between 
different institutions (business to business). XML security specifications published by 
W3C have addressed XML encryption (Imamura, Dillaway, & Simon, 2002). XML 
encryption is mainly used to ensure XML data confidentiality and authenticity. 
However, institutions that deal with large volumes of transactions on a daily basis 
require a flexible and solid mechanism to process XML messages that performs 
element-wise encryption in a timely and efficient manner . 
Encrypting sensitive information only within the XML document is a complicated issue 
to analyse; it needs to take into consideration the process of encrypting different 
portions within the XML document every time the message is transmitted. This is 
complex to analyse because the classification requires set of factors to consider.  
Despite there are handful of applications available to secure XML messages, there are 
no known solutions that utilize fuzzy classification techniques in detecting sensitive 
information within each XML document. 
 
The motivation behind our research is to create an effective, powerful, and intelligent 
model to classify XML messages by detecting sensitive information within XML 
documents, in order to perform element-wise encryption on selected parts . 
We have conducted a quantitative methodology in our research, and it explores fuzzy 
XML classification systems. The technique uses FL to process XML data features and 
patterns, for extracting the message‘s fuzzy classification rules into the data miner, and 
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then for applying element-wise encryption algorithms on selected portions extracted 
from XML data features and patterns. The proposed XML security model combines 
fuzzy techniques for the purpose of automating the fuzzy rules. The automation process 
is completed by extracting the set of fuzzy rules that are going to be deployed inside the 
fuzzy inference engine. Therefore, a set of IF-THEN rules are constructed using these 
fuzzy rules. The IF-THEN rules reflect the relations between different transaction 
characteristics and patterns and their associations with one another. These rules can then 
be used for the final stage, which uses element-wise encryption with different key sizes 
based on the importance levels assigned . 
 
Our previous expertise in the banking and financial sector in Jordan shed the light on 
the importance of securing business and financial transactions based on XML. Many 
researches and case studies have been reviewed and evaluated in order to find a robust 
and flexible solution that can be used with ease and efficiency. 
 
1.3 Aims & Objectives  
Our prime aim is to build a system that secure financial XML messages that uses FL to 
classify XML content to perform XML encryption, in order to provide necessary data 
confidentiality for classified portions within an XML document. This mechanism 
enhances the performance of encrypting XML documents on high-volume transactions. 
In order to reach this aim, there are several objectives: 
Our objectives can be summarized with the following points: 
1. Conduct a literature review to illustrate the current and existing approaches 
concerning XML security, fuzzy XML models, and XML data confidentiality. 
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2. Build a resilient, intelligent, dynamic, and secure XML messaging system that 
uses artificial intelligence and FL to fetch and classify sensitive information 
within XML documents. The outcome system has to be adaptive, flexible, and 
efficient. 
3.  Illustrate feasibility and adaptability after analysing a large number of actual 
transaction datasets fetched over period of time reflecting internet banking 
transactions, phone banking transactions, and mobile banking transactions. 
4. Present the applicability of applying an FL expert system in order to classify and 
find out importance levels within XML documents. Fuzzy rules are being used 
for and driven by human expert knowledge on creating flexible and secure XML 
messaging systems. 
5. Provide a solution that improves existing XML encryption approaches and 
illustrates a performance improvement over well-known XML encryption 
models, like W3C XML Encryption Recommendations. We illustrate the 
enhancements and processing improvements by securing only the necessary 
parts with high importance levels within XML documents. 
 
We have implemented a quantitative research methodology to enable us achieving all 
above objectives, taking into consideration experimental studies, case analysis, data 
collection, testing, evaluation, and comparing final results. 
 
1.4 Research Contribution 
This research will contribute to the fields of XML security, fuzzy XML in general, 
XML encryption, and fuzzification, specifically in the following areas: 
1. A robust XML security model has been introduced performing element-wise 
encryption to encrypt critical and sensitive parts within XML documents that are 
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used in business and financial institutions. This technique encrypts XML 
documents efficiently by encrypting only the sensitive parts within each XML 
document by using a set of fuzzy variables. Significant processing time 
improvements have been recorded against a well-known approach (W3C XML 
Encryption Recommendations). 
2. An efficient and secure XML model has been created to reduce encrypted XML 
file sizes, due to the fact that only essential parts within each XML document 
are encrypted, leaving other nodes intact without encryption. Reduce file sizes 
will reduced bandwidth used on large scale.  
3. A fuzzy classification engine has been created to determine which parts within 
each XML document require encryption. The fuzzification engine works by 
assigning an importance level to each tag within the XML document. The 
importance level value is set by the engine for later encryption processing; the 
importance level is assigned using one of three values (high, medium, or low). 
The fuzzification process itself is based on fuzzy logic, which uses a 
combination of human expert knowledge and a set of IF-THEN operators.  
4. A resilient XML encryption system has been created whereby future 
enhancements can be achieved without the need to redesign the whole system. 
The encryption standards and algorithms used within the system are flexible and 
can be changed when needed; different encryption algorithms can be used to 
replace existing algorithms either to improve performance or to add more 
security. 
5. A set of XML fuzzy classification characteristics has been created that were 
fetched from actual financial XML transactions. There are ten main 
characteristics that were created by using a hybrid of personal expertise, onsite 
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financial analysts, a set of questionnaires, and a set of surveys. These ten 
characteristics define the classification criteria we will use in our fuzzy 
classification stage. 
6. A desktop application has been designed and developed to test and validate our 
proposed model. Application developed based on reliability, feasibility, and 
extraction process of the mechanism. The application was programmed using 
the Java programming language. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis  
Here to present a brief outline of the thesis: 
In Chapter 2, the research background is discussed. XML models are included, XML 
application program interfaces, XML schema languages, cryptographic algorithms for 
data confidentiality, XML security models (with XML encryption standards described), 
text categorization, and FL models and design. 
In Chapter 3, the literature review is presented. The contents of the literature review 
mainly focus on existing ideas and solutions related to XML encryption. It looks at the 
existing models, theories, and schemes of XML encryption for ensuring XML data 
confidentiality. Existing fuzzy XML techniques and models are also addressed to cover 
all aspects of our research. 
In Chapter 4, a full description is given and introduced of a novel model for securing 
financial XML documents by encrypting specific portions within the documents. 
Selection is performed based on the XML fuzzification phase to determine which parts 
are to be encrypted and what types of encryption algorithm and key are to be deployed. 
We call our model SXMS, which stands for secure XML management system. This 
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description includes the main model design, concepts, and workflow that are used in 
this model . 
An illustration of the system design and architecture and the tools used for 
implementing the system of the SXMS model is also given. A theoretical execution 
based on the case study is also offered. This section presents the classes for encrypting 
and decrypting XML messages based on the importance level assigned, as well as the 
process of building the final XML document by deploying the needed XML encryption 
with different key sizes based on XML data sensitivity for each XML portion . 
In Chapter 5, a detailed system implementation has been described. Development 
architecture and used tools have been introduced to elaborate on how the system 
implemented. Used testing strategy, testing behaviour, testing data, and testing 
functionality have been introduced as well.  Testing validation against W3C XML 
Recommendations (Imamura et al., 2002)  has been presented to present SXMS 
advantage. Finally an independent testing for the major modules, fuzzy classification 
stage, and XML encryption has been illustrated. 
In Chapter 6, the full performance evaluation stages are discussed. The evaluation 
stages are presented to give a clear idea of the mechanism we followed in our 
evaluation, presenting the basic components that we used in our evaluation and 
judgements. Finally, we provide screenshots of the developed application and samples 
of the source code used to develop this application . 
In Chapter 7, an overview of the thesis along with a discussion of future research 
directions are presented. 
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Chapter 2  
 
 
 
Research Background 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce the XML model with all its detailed components, and then 
we briefly introduce the XML language and its structure. Cryptographic algorithms and 
types are presented. The XML security model is presented as well. Specifically, we 
present XML digital signatures, XML Encryption, XML key management, SAML, and 
XACML security models. We then present the information retrieval mechanism in 
general and XML fuzzy classification specifically. Finally, we introduce the fuzzy logic 
model in details.  
 
2.2 XML Model 
EXtensible Markup Language (XML) was first announced in 1998 (W3C, 1998). This 
proposed markup language became the standard for data exchange and representation 
among many online and offline applications, providing the flexibility of exchanging 
different digital content among applications. An XML document is formed in a 
hierarchical structure with the ability to define its element contents, define tags, create 
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nested document structures, and build document types by specifying a set of regular 
expression patterns (XML Schema or Document Type Definitions (DTD)). An XML 
document incorporates structure and data in one entity. Therefore, XML data is semi-
structured data (S. Abiteboul, 1996). 
The solid set of XML characteristics created an interest in building effective solutions 
to support the following advantages: 
 Extensibility: New fields and tags can be created when they are needed. There 
are no fixed set of fields. 
 Self-description: This feature allows any XML field to process an unlimited 
number of attributes. 
 Readability: XML is easy for humans or machines to read and understand. This 
feature facilitates the usage of XML by different applications and users. 
 Simplicity: XML code is easy to understand; also, it can be easily processed and 
deployed in different practices. Updating the existing XML Schema is an easy 
and straightforward operation. 
 Supports multilingual documents and Unicode: This is important for the 
internationalization of applications. 
 Interoperability: There is the ability to use XML documents in any industry 
without the need to make changes to the data itself. XML is treated as an 
independent unit from both the machine and software levels. 
 Portability: An XML document has the ability to represent different data types, 
such as ordinary text and binary files (images, videos, and sounds). 
However, there are some drawbacks in XML, which include: 
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 Syntax redundancy: This can affect human readability and system efficiency, 
and this can result in higher storage requirements and resource usage. 
Bandwidth limitations can prevent XML being deployed in certain applications. 
 A number of vague, unneeded features within XML: Efforts were made to create 
"Minimal XML", which led to the discovery that there was no consensus on 
which features were in fact obscure or unnecessary. 
 A wide range of data types are not supported in the basic parsing requirements: 
Some additional work might be required to process the desired data in the XML 
document. 
 A significant overhead for various uses of XML: This mainly applies where 
resources may be limited. This might happen because of the parser‘s limitations 
in recursing arbitrarily nested data structures or the missing feature of 
performing additional checking and validation for improperly formatted syntax 
or data. 
 Security concerns: These may arise when XML input is fed from unknown or 
untrusted sources 
 Difficulty in modelling overlapping data structures: This requires extra effort. 
 
2.2.1 Well-formed XML 
A well-formed XML document is one which corresponds to the XML 1.0 (Bray, Paoli, 
Sperberg-McQueen, Maler, & Yergeau, 2007) grammar specified by W3C. It has just 
one root element, which is known as the document element. Each starting element tag 
must have a corresponding closing tag. Each element ought to be nested within one 
another. Nesting rules with defined labels enable information to be represented by XML 
hierarchically. Figure 2.1 illustrates a sample of a well-formed XML message. 
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Figure 2.1: Sample of a well-formed XML message 
 
 
2.2.2 XML Components 
An XML document consists of elements that represent a piece of information. More 
specific information can be found in nested elements, such as character data, attributes, 
and entity references. These elements are marked up by the tags in a specific document. 
Between the start tag and end tag of an element there is the element content, presented 
as text content. 
1. Elements: Elements start with an opening tag (<t>) and end with an ending tag 
(</t>). Everything between the starting and ending tags is called the element 
content. Each element has an element name (e), which should follow the 
following rules: 
- The element name should not start with "XML" or "xml". 
- The element name is case sensitive. 
- The element name starts with a character or an underscore. 
- The element name consists of characters, numerals, underscores, and tabs. 
2. Attributes: Attributes are information that can provide more information about 
the element and often define an instance of an element. Attributes have a name 
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defined. For example, <book name="Learn C++ in 24 days"> is a book element 
with an attribute name that has the value "Learn C++ in 24 days". 
3. Comments: Comments can be placed anywhere inside the XML document for 
further explanation or description. Comments are not part of the main document 
and can be used by using the start tag (<!—) and the end tag (-->). 
4. XML declaration: An XML declaration supplies the XML processor with 
information such as encoding, version, and any other information related to the 
document. A declaration can be defined with a start tag (<?xml) and an end tag 
(?>). 
5. Processing Instructions (PIs): PIs may occur anywhere in the XML document. 
Their main purpose is to carry specific instructions to the application. A PI is 
represented within the document in the form of : <?Target instructions for 
command?>. 
6. CDATA sections: Using CDATA will tell the XML parser that there is no 
markup in the characters during the time of processing. Sections can be defined 
by using: <! [CDATA]!>. 
 
2.3 XML Schema Languages 
XML schema languages, like XML Schema (D. C. Fallside & Walmsley, 2004), DTDs, 
DSDs (M\oller, 2005), Schematron  (Jelliffe, 2006), and RELAX NG (Makoto, Walsh, 
& McRae, 2001), are used to certify XML documents. The reason for 
certifying/validating a document is to verify whether the XML document conforms to a 
set of structural and content rules expressed in one of many schema languages. The 
validation procedure happens on at least four primary levels (Ray, 2003): 
1. Structure: Relates to the placement and use of markup elements and attributes. 
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2. Data typing: Relates to the set of numbers, dates, and texts (patterns of character 
data). 
3. Integrity: Relates to the linkage between resources and corresponding nodes. 
4. Business rules: Relates to collections of tests such as spelling checks, checksum 
results, etc. 
 
2.3.1 Document Type Definition (DTD) 
The Document Type Definition (DTD) (Hunter, Cagle, Dix, & Cable, 2001) is a set of 
rules that define the hierarchical structure of any XML document. The XML parser 
utilizes these rules to determine whether the XML document is valid or not. The DTD 
consists of four basic parts: elements, attributes, tags, and entities. A declared element 
specifies the name of the element and the valid content. Tags are used to indicate 
elements. Attributes are used to provide additional details about an element and can be 
used to describe element properties as well. Entities are the variables that can be reused 
within the document. Figure 2.2 illustrates a sample DTD example. 
 
Figure 2.2: A DTD Example 
2.3.2 XML Schema 
XML Schema (Hunter et al., 2001) is a DTD alternative that is based on XML. Users 
can exploit XML Schema to represent an XML document structure. An XML Schema 
Definition (XSD) is regarded as XML Schema language. 
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XML Schemas can take the place of DTDs in most web applications. XML Schemas 
are written in XML and are present in well-formed XML documents. XML Schemas 
support data types such as string, date and time, and integers. XML Schemas can be 
used to construct complex data types as well. 
 
2.3.3 RELAX NG 
RELAX NG is a schema language for XML developed by ISO/IEC JTC1/SC34/WG1 
(Makoto et al., 2001). RELAX NG is based on two languages. The first language is the 
Tree Regular Expressions for XML (TREX) designed by James Clark (Clark, 2001); the 
second language is the Regular Language description for XML (RELAX) designed by 
Murata Makoto (Makoto, 2002). The primary idea of RELAX NG consists of patterns 
that are formed to widen the range of the idea of the content model. In RELAX NG, a 
pattern is an expression of elements, text nodes, and attributes. The definitions of data 
types may be utilized for constraining the sets of values of text nodes and attributes. 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates an example of a RELAX NG Schema. 
 
Figure 2.3: A RELAX NG Schema example 
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2.3.4 Document Structure Description (DSD) 
A Document Structure Description is a schema language developed by combined efforts 
from BRICS and AT&T Labs (Klarlund, Møller, & Schwartzbach, 2000; M\oller, 
2005). Constraints form the basic concept of a DSD. A restraint is used to define the 
content of an element, corresponding attributes, and its particular context. A pair 
consisting of an element name and a restraint forms the definition of an element. 
Element content is constrained by means of a content expression, which is a regular 
expression over element definitions. To force constraints on the context of an element, 
context patterns are used. 
 
2.3.5 Schematron 
Schematron is schema language based on rules developed by Rick Jelliffe at the 
Academia Sinica Computing Centre (ASCC) (Jelliffe, 2006). The main functionality of 
Schematron is to perform co-constraints checking in XML instance documents. A 
sequence of rules is defined by a Schematron document, which is grouped in a logical 
way in pattern elements. A context attribute is included within each rule and used by an 
XPath pattern to determine the elements to which the rule applies. Within each rule, a 
sequence of reports and elements are specified with a testing attribute, which considered 
an XPath expression. This expression is evaluated to a value of Boolean type for each 
node within the context. 
 
2.4 XML API 
 
Application Program Interfaces (APIs) are used by many programming languages to 
access XML document information without the need to create and write a parser in the 
specific used language. 
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2.4.1 DOM Parser 
The DOM (Document Object Model) parser is utilized as a hierarchical object model to 
get XML document information (Hégaret, Whitmer, & Wood, 2005). The whole XML 
document's information is being read by DOM parser, and establishes the corresponding 
DOM object tree of nodes. The construction is being performed in main memory. This 
XML parser is appropriate for small to medium XML documents that may fit in 
memory. DOM can be utilized in document-centric document whereby the sequence of 
elements within the document is essential. The sequence of elements is preserved due to 
direct read from the document. It has multiple functions for traversing XML trees and 
other relevant functions like (insert, delete, and access nodes). 
 
2.4.2 SAX Parser 
The Simple Application Interface for XML (SAX) parser provides accessibility to XML 
information as a series of events. For every open tag, closing tag, and every #PCDATA 
and CDATA section, SAX activates an event. These events along with the 
corresponding sequences need to be interpreted by the document handler. SAX is 
suitable for medium to large XML documents; this is because there is no need to parse 
XML documents in main memory first. SAX is suitable for structured XML documents 
as well, as the sequence for elements not essential. 
 
2.4.3 Java API for XML 
The Java programming language (and some other languages) provides different types of 
XML Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), such as SAX, DOM, and XSLT 
(Mclaughlin & Edelson, 2006; Violleau, 2001; Williams, 2009), in order to process 
XML documents by means of writing a computer program using several programming 
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languages. SAX (Simple API for XML) scans the XML document sequentially and 
throws up events that the programmer can handle. These events are thrown up by the 
parser when it detects the start document and end document tags, as well as the start 
element tag, including a list of all its attributes, end elements, and characters. The 
programmer should write suitable code for each event to process an entire XML 
document. Since each event occurs only once for each element, all the required work 
needed to process the document should be done in one cycle. 
 
2.5 Cryptographic Algorithms for Confidentiality 
 
2.5.1 Encryption Mechanism 
The encryption mechanism is the process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext and 
vice versa. Plaintext is readable content that needs rendering to be unreadable. 
Ciphertext is encrypted plaintext in which no semantic content is available. An 
encryption mechanism transforms plaintext into ciphertext. A decryption mechanism 
transforms ciphertext back into plaintext. In order to be able to re-use a particular 
algorithm in many systems, the algorithm is parameterized by a key. Figure 2.4 
illustrates encryption mechanisms. 
 
Figure 2.4: A generic encryption system 
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Key: ―A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of encryption and 
decryption.‖ 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, to encrypt plaintext (P), the encryption algorithm (E) is 
parameterized with a confidentiality encryption key (K). Ciphertext (C) is decrypted 
using the confidentiality decryption key ( ).  
Encrypting plaintext (P) under the key (K) produces ciphertext (C) and is denoted 
as . The decryption of C under the key  reproduces the plaintext P and is 
denoted as . 
Cryptography uses two different types of encryption systems: symmetric encryption 
systems and asymmetric encryption systems. 
 
2.5.2 Symmetric Cryptography 
Symmetric encryption system: This type of encryption system is based on symmetric 
cryptographic techniques that use one secret key for both the encryption and decryption 
algorithms. 
Symmetric cryptographic technique: This cryptographic technique uses a shared 
secret key. Symmetric encryption systems have the property that both the encryption 
key and the decryption key have the same value. 
 
Figure 2.5: Symmetric cryptographic cycle 
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Secret Key: ―A key that is used with a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. 
Possession of a secret key is restricted )usually to two entities)‖ (ISO10181-1). The 
secret key can be generated in various ways: 
 by the encrypting entity (encryptor) illustrated in figure 2.5; 
 by the decryptor; 
 by a trusted third party (TTP), like a key distribution centre (KDC); or 
 It can be derived from parameters in a key agreement protocol that is performed 
by both the encryptor and the decryptor. 
If the key is not computed using a key agreement protocol, the key must be transported 
through a secure channel that is protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity. 
Additionally, the recipient(s) of the secret key must know the source of the key, i.e. data 
origin authentication for the transported key is necessary.  
The ciphertext itself can be transported through an unprotected channel. 
 
Symmetric cryptographic algorithm: ―An algorithm for performing encryption or the 
corresponding algorithm for performing decryption in which the same key is required 
for both encryption and decryption‖ (ISO10181-1). 
Algorithms that perform symmetric encryption are grouped into two classes: 
1. Block ciphers 
2. Stream ciphers 
 
A block cipher processes blocks of plaintext to create blocks of ciphertext. A block is a 
string of n bits; such a block cipher is called an n-bit block cipher. Typical algorithms 
that are used in today‘s systems include: 
 AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) 
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 3DES (Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard), also known as TDEA: Triple 
Data Encryption Algorithm) 
 IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) 
 Various other block ciphers, like the other AES candidates (e.g. Blowfish or 
RC6). 
The plaintext bit sequence is segmented into n-bit blocks, as the block cipher needs n bit 
as its input. To allow cases where the input length is not a multiple of n bit, a padding 
mechanism is usually used with a block cipher. The padding algorithm defines an 
unambiguous way in which each plaintext is extended to a length of a multiple of n bit. 
This is done even if the length of the plaintext is already a multiple of n bit. So, if a 
padding mechanism is used, the length of the ciphertext is larger than the length of the 
plaintext. After decrypting with the block cipher, the padded bits are removed from the 
decrypted data. 
The mechanisms closely related to block ciphers are modes of operation. Modes define 
how the inputs and outputs of consecutive block cipher operations are combined. This is 
done to ensure that the same plaintext block results in different ciphertext blocks 
throughout the ciphertext stream and to chain the blocks together to prevent substitution 
attacks . 
A stream cipher combines a sequence of plaintext symbols with a sequence of 
keystream symbols, one symbol at a time, using an invertible function (for single bits as 
a symbol, the function is usually an exclusive bit or a between-keystream bit and a 
plaintext bit). Typical stream cipher algorithms include RC4 and A5, which are n-bit 
block ciphers that operate in a specific mode to create a key symbol stream. 
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2.5.3 Asymmetric Cryptography 
Asymmetric encryption system: ―Encryption system based on asymmetric 
cryptographic techniques whose public transformation is used for encipherment and 
whose private transformation is used for decipherment‖ (ISO/IEC9798-1, 1997). 
 
Asymmetric cryptographic technique: ―Cryptographic technique that uses two related 
transformations, a public transformation (defined by the public key) and a private 
transformation (defined by the private key). The two transformations have the property 
that, given the public transformation, it is computationally infeasible to derive the 
private transformation‖ (ISO/IEC11770). 
In an asymmetric encryption system, the encryption key K (also called the public key) 
and the decryption key K^(-1) (also called the private key) have distinct values, but 
these values have a mathematical relationship that is defined by the underlying 
cryptographic algorithm, as illustrated in figure 2.6 
 
Figure 2.6: Asymmetric cryptographic cycle 
 
Private Key: ―A key that is used with an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and 
whose possession is restricted )usually to only one entity)‖ (I.-T. X. I. 10181-1, 1996). 
Public Key: ―A key that is used with an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and that 
can be made publicly available‖ (I.-T. R. X. I. I. 10181-1, 1996). 
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A key pair consists of a public and the corresponding private key. The generation of a 
key pair can be performed by different parties: 
 The key pair can be generated by the decryptor. In this case, the decryptor can 
publish the public key in a directory service or directly send the public key to 
the encryptor. This case is shown in figure 2.6. Note that the channel for 
transporting the public key does not have to be protected in terms of 
confidentiality. 
 The key pair can be generated by a trusted third party. In this case, the private 
key must be transmitted to the decryptor via a channel that is protected in terms 
of confidentiality. 
 
The private key must be protected by the decryptor. Regardless of which entity 
undertakes the key pair generation, the public key must be made available to the 
encryptor. The encryptor must be confident that the public key belongs to the decryptor. 
This can be achieved using digital certificates (if a trusted third party is available) or by 
transport through integrity-protected channels with data origin authentication enabled. 
Asymmetric cryptographic algorithm: The most commonly used asymmetric 
encryption algorithm is the RSA algorithm, named after its inventors (Rivest, Shamir, & 
Adleman, 1978). The RSA algorithm is based on the difficulty of factoring large 
integers. 
 
2.6 XML Security Models 
XML security standards present the major processing rules for the fulfilment of security 
requirements. Basically, XML security standards use traditional cryptographic protocols 
and security standards, all combined with XML technologies. The XML security 
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standards include XML Encryption (Imamura et al., 2002) to provide confidentiality, 
XML digital signatures (Bartel, Boyer, Fox, LaMacchia, & Simon, 2002) to cover 
integrity, XML key management (XKMS) (Hallam-Baker & Mysore, 2005) to provide 
public key registration and validation, XML Access Control Mark-up Language 
(XACML) (GODIK & MOSES, 2002) for stating authorization rules, and security 
assertion markup language -SAML (OASIS, 2002) to cover authentication and attribute 
assertions. 
An XML security model needs to support the following: 
1. A robust authorization mechanism whereby it can control accessibility to 
content and structure. 
2. Ability to reuse existing security and cryptographic technologies when needed. 
3. The ability to enforce security policies efficiently without the need to look up 
the underlying document. 
4. Schema information, characterizing exactly those elements accessible to each 
type of user. 
 
2.6.1 XML Signature 
XML Signature was first introduced by (Bartel et al., 2002), XML Signature defines a 
standard format to represent digital signatures in XML, it provides a method for 
efficiently employing digital signatures to XML resources. However, XML Signature 
may also be utilized to sign binary resources like videos, images, and sound files. 
Several resources within XML can be covered by one signature, whether it is a whole 
document, part of a document, or a binary document.  
 
W3C has established related specifications that are required when the actual XML 
Signature is deployed. These specifications are: 
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1. Exclusive XML Canonicalization Version 1.0, published by W3C (JOHN 
BOYER, EASTLAKE, & REAGLE, 2002). 
2. Canonical XML Version 1.0, published by W3C Recommendation (J. Boyer, 
2001). 
3. XML Signature XPath Filter 2.0, published by W3C Recommendations (J. 
Boyer, Hughes, & Reagle, 2003). 
The above specifications led W3C to publish a second edition (Bartel, Boyer, Fox, 
LaMacchia, & Simon, 2008). Figure 2.7 represents the XML Signature element‘s basic 
structure. 
 
Figure 2.7: XML Signature structure 
 
As illustrated in figure 2.7, the structure of XML Signature starts from the 
<ds:Signature> element at the top of the document. The root element <ds:Signature> 
contains four main sub-elements, which are: <ds:SignedInfo>, <ds:SignatureValue>, 
<ds:KeyInfo>, and <ds:Object>. The element <ds:SignedInfo> includes references to 
the applied algorithms used in XML Signature generation, the hash value, and the target 
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in the XML data (Weerasinghe, Elmufti, Rajarajan, & Rakocevic, 2006). Signature 
results are stored in the element <ds:SignatureValue>; element <ds:KeyInfo> contains 
the public key information that is used when the XML Signature is verified. The 
element <ds:Reference> within the element <ds:SignedInfo> is connected with each 
resource; A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) identifies all resources. A digest of the 
referenced resource is included in the <ds:Reference> element. The <ds:SignedInfo> 
element can contain multiple <ds:Reference> elements. The element <ds:SignedInfo> 
contains references to the resources being signed. Therefore, an XML signature might 
be enveloping, enveloped, or detached taking into consideration each referenced 
resource. Figure 2.8 illustrates enveloped, detached, and enveloping signatures. 
 
Figure 2.8: Enveloped, detached, and enveloping signatures 
 
If the Signature element is within the referenced XML resource, then we call this 
signature an enveloped signature. If the signature references a resource that is separate 
from the Signature element, then we call this signature a detached signature. Finally if 
the signature references a resource that is contained within the Signature element, then 
we call this signature an enveloping signature. When the signature is enveloping, an 
instance of the object element is used to contain the resource.  
As the Signature element of an enveloped signature is actually located within the XML 
document being signed, an enveloped signature transform is deﬁned. This transform 
removes the entire Signature element from the digest calculation, so that the Signature 
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element is not included in the digest of the XML resource being signed. Otherwise it 
would not be possible to calculate the correct digest, considering that the resource (from 
which the digest is to be calculated) would be subject to change when adding the digest 
to the Signature element. XML Encryption also uses <ds:KeyInfo> element, this 
element is defined by XML Signature. The <ds:KeyInfo> element is extended by XML 
Encryption with an <EncryptedKey> element, which might support the transport for a 
symmetric/secret key. The <KeyInfo> element is used by the XML Key Management 
Speciﬁcation as well. 
 
2.6.2 XML Encryption 
XML Encryption was first released by W3C as a proposed recommendation (Eastlake & 
Reagle, 2002; Imamura et al., 2002), providing encryption for different sizes of units. 
The units may be a whole XML document, an element within a document, XML 
element content, or an attribute. 
XML Encryption is an encryption technology that is optimized for XML data. A format 
is provided for using the XML processing rules in encryption and decryption processes. 
XML Encryption can be performed partially, which encrypts selected tags within the 
XML document, or multiple times, which enables the data to be encrypted multiple 
times. XML can be used to facilitate resolving XML data eavesdropping. 
Generally, an XML element containing encrypted XML information can act as a 
container for the encrypted data, keys, or both. XML Encryption is able to encrypt the 
whole XML document and is also capable of encrypting parts of the XML document 
(Geuer-Pollmann, 2002). The inclusion of encrypted content can be as a reference via 
the transform machine or can be included in the container. Key management is offered 
by XML Encryption to facilitate the symmetric wrapping of the private keys being used, 
private key transportation, and key agreements using a Diffie-Hellman key (Diffie & 
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Hellman, 1976) exchange. By using the XML Encryption standard, we gain a number of 
benefits, including: 
 An XML element can act as a container for encrypted data, as a container for 
encrypted key material, or as a container for both. However, in order to act like a 
container, the XML element should contain XML Encryption information. 
 User data can be encrypted by using XML Encryption, like: 
- Full XML documents (Geuer-Pollmann, 2002) 
- Single elements inside an XML document 
- The content of an element inside an XML document 
- Arbitrary binary content outside of an XML document 
 The ability to allow direct inclusion of the encrypted content in the container. 
 The ability to de-reference the encrypted content via the URI / transforms 
mechanism. 
 XML Encryption offers key management facilities for: 
- The symmetric wrapping of secret keys. 
- Key transport of secret keys. 
- Key agreement using a Diffie-Hellman key. 
 
Figure 2.9: XML Encryption structure 
Figure 2.9 illustrates the structure of XML Encryption provided by W3C. Data objects 
are encapsulated within a defined encryption element called <EncryptedData>. This 
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element contains essential sub-elements that describe how the data is encrypted; the first 
sub-element is <EncryptionMethod>, which determines which encryption algorithm is 
used within the XML message. The second sub-element is <EncryptedKey>, which is 
used to transport encryption keys between the sender and receiver; it can also be used 
individually in a separate XML message. <KeyInfo> is the third sub-element and is used 
to specify the associated keying material. Another major element is <CipherData>, a 
mandatory element that provides the encrypted data. It must contain the encrypted octet 
sequence of the base64 encoded text of the <CipherValue> element. Another way is by 
providing a reference to an external location that contains an encrypted octet sequence 
location via another element called <CipherReference>. Figure 2.10 and figure 2.11 
represent both the <EncryptedData> element and the <EncryptedKey> element with all 
their sub-elements. 
 
Figure 2.10: <EncryptedData> element and components 
 
Figure 2.11: <EncryptedKey> element and components 
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The W3C XML Encryption Recommendation allows two different granularity levels: 
encryption of full sub-trees whereby a single element and all its descendants are 
encrypted, and encryption of sequences of sub-trees whereby a sub-tree can be a single 
node or a mixed sequence (comments, elements, text, and processing instructions). 
 
Figure 2.12: W3C Encryption possibilities (modes) 
  Drawing A in figure 2.12 presents the encryption of a sub-tree rooted by the 
element ‗X‘. The element and all its descendants are encrypted into a single 
<EncryptedData> element. 
 Drawing B in figure 2.12 presents the encryption of the content of element ‗X‘. 
All children of the element and their respective descendants are encrypted into a 
single <EncryptedData> element. 
 Drawing C in figure 2.12 presents sub-tree encryption applied three times to 
each child of element ‗X‘. Each sub-tree rooted by a child node of element ‗X‘ 
is encrypted into a separate <EncryptedData> element. 
 Drawing D in figure 2.12 presents a way to use content encryption: two 
subsequent sub-trees are grouped together and are encrypted together. 
 The decryption in drawings A and C leads to single elements. The octets resulting after 
the decryption in drawings B and D are not directly parseable but must be wrapped in a 
start tag / end tag combination. 
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2.6.2.1 Encryption for Multiple Recipients 
1- Encrypting the same content: There are different ways to encrypt any resource 
intended for multiple recipients. The basic case is where all recipients have the privilege 
to see the same portion of the document, which means the content is encrypted only 
once, whereas the content encryption key is encrypted multiple times (once for each 
recipient). The document should include a single <EncryptedData> element for the 
encrypted content and an <EncryptedKey> element for each recipient, which includes 
the content encryption key encrypted under the recipient‘s key. 
 
2- Super Encryption: When recipients are allowed to see different portions of a 
document, then there is a way to encrypt content for multiple recipients. Figure 2.13 
illustrates the process of encrypting encrypted content multiple times. 
 
Figure 2.13: Encrypting the encrypted content for multiple recipients (super-encryption) 
 
The process of encrypting parts of an XML tree leads to the substitution of the existing 
plaintext structure with the appropriate XML Encryption element <EncryptedData>. 
Super-encryption applies when the <EncryptedData> element or its ancestors are 
encrypted. 
As illustrated in figure 2.13, the element ‗T‘ sub-tree is encrypted under a key B for a 
recipient B. After the first step, the element ‗S‘ sub-tree is encrypted under key A for 
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both recipients A and B. Keys A and B are processed by recipient B. Key A is 
processed only by recipient A. After the two encryption steps, the main document 
contains the ‗R‘ element and two unencrypted notes along with the <EncryptedData> 
element, which has the encrypted element ‗S‘ and its descendants. Both recipients A 
and B can decrypt the outer <EncryptedData> element because they have key A. The 
decrypted element ‗S‘ contains the inner <EncryptedData> element.  
 
The inner <EncryptedData> element can only by decrypted by recipient B because 
recipient B is the only one who possesses key B. There is a part in the document where 
recipient A is aware that he is not able to decrypt it. Recipient A can make an estimation 
of how large the plaintext (undecrypted) portion is. This estimation is based on the 
number of octets of the undecryptable ciphertext. Recipient B has both content 
decryption keys A and B and performs the decryption in two stages: decrypting the 
<EncryptedData> element containing ‗T‘ is performed after decrypting the 
<EncryptedData> element that contains the ‗S‘ plaintext.  
After performing the decryption process, the document is decrypted in full and is 
available to recipient B. Recipient B acknowledges that super-encryption of the 
innermost <EncryptedData> is done in order to prevent other users accessing the inner 
information. 
 
2.6.2.2 Serialization of XML for XML Encryption 
Usually, symmetric encryption algorithms such as DES and AES are used for 
encrypting large amounts of data. Symmetric encryption algorithms transform a 
plaintext octet string into a ciphertext octet string and vice versa. Due to the tree-
structured nature of XML, it must be converted into an octet string prior the encryption 
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process, and then converted back from an octet string into a tree-based structure after 
the decryption process. 
In order to encrypt portions of a given XML document, the application selects balanced 
portions of XML and serializes them into a UTF-8 encoded octet sequence. 
Namespace nodes and associated attributes in the XML namespace need to be taken 
care of: moving encrypted data into a different context can lead to inconsistent results 
after the decryption process. Such issues happen if the decrypted plaintext uses 
namespace prefixes without defining them. 
 
2.6.2.3 Example of XML Encryption 
Figure 2.14 illustrates a sample XML message fetched from a real production 
environment. Considering the plaintext shown in figure 2.14, this represents a financial 
transaction containing public information about the transaction (payee name and branch 
code) and sensitive information (payee account). 
 
Figure 2.14: Sample XML financial message 
 
Parts of the XML message shown in figure 2.14 will be encrypted. Figure 2.15 
illustrates the sample XML message after deploying XML encryption on the selected 
tag <From_Account>, which denotes the full account number of the payee. 
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Figure 2.15: Sample XML financial message after partial W3C encryption 
 
The <Transaction> element was substituted by an <EncryptedData> element of type 
element. The <EncryptedData> element contains the <CipherData> element, which 
uses a <CipherValue> element to save the encrypted <Transaction> element and all its 
descendants. 
 
2.6.2.4 Example Implementations of XML Encryption 
One of the most well-known implementations of XML encryption is XEnc (Imamura et 
al., 2002). XEnc is a stream-based prototype implementation that uses the Xerces 
Native Interface (XNI) of Xerces2. The implementation using XNI API achieves a 
reduction in processing time of 0.27%–26% for XML documents encryption that have 
sizes larger than 2KB and 34-88% reduction in decryption of XML documents of any 
size. Despite the reduced processing time, the issue has been raised as to whether XNI 
SAX API capable of parsing decrypted data efficiently. 
XEnc uses DOM in many if not most of the implmentations, rather than using SAX 
API. preferring DOM than SAX as DOM because that DOM has the ability to parse 
decrypted data in an efficient way. However, Implementing DOM cost more time and 
space compared to SAX API due to XML document being parsed in memory. 
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2.6.2.5 Issues Regarding Attribute Values 
XEnc uses element-wise encryption as a security mechanism, which secures both 
elements and content. Despite the flexible nature of XEnc. However, it is impossible to 
handle attribute encryption due to the XML Encryption Syntax and Processing rules. 
There are two solutions proposed by Simon (Ed, 2000), who first uncovered this issue. 
It is assumed that the alt attribute of the video element in figure 2.16 will be encrypted. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: The alt attribute (to be encrypted) of a video element 
 
The first solution was proposed to replace the targeted attribute that needs encryption 
with the < EncryptedDataManifest>  attribute and adding other encryption details within 
the element. The output of this solution is illustrated in figure 2.17. 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Output of encrypting the alt attribute of the video element 
 
The second solution was proposed to transform the attribute into elements by using 
XSLT to be used for encryption. However, this proposed solution is inefficient because 
the decrypted needs to be transformed back into attributes. Transformation is needed to 
validate the document against its XML Schema (if there is one). 
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2.6.3 XML Key Management 
XKMS stands for XML Key Management Specification. XKMS Version 1.0 was first 
submitted to the W3C in 2001 (Phillip M & Ford, 2001). XKMS Version 2.0 was 
proposed and published in 2005 by Hallam-Baker (Hallam-Baker & Mysore, 2005). 
The main objective of XKMS is to provide a way to implement a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) in web services and applications (King, 2003). XKMS has been 
developed to facilitate PKI handling, providing a simplified interface through which the 
application can pass. XKMS simplifies PKI handling by moving the complexity of 
dealing with the PKI from the application to the XKMS service itself. The application is 
thus protected from primary complexities (O'Neill, 2003). 
In both cases, X-KRSS provides mechanisms for authenticating clients. X-KISS defines 
two main services: locate service and validate service. <KeyInfo> element provides the 
data format that is needed for communicating key information; this element is defined 
by XML Encryption. Thus, it will facilitate the utilization of XKMS together with XML 
Encryption and XML Signature. 
XKMS consist of two parts. The first part is called X-KRSS, which stands for XML 
Key Registration Service Specification. The second part is called X-KISS, which stands 
for XML Key Information Service Specification. X-KRSS defines the services for the 
processes of registering, revoking, recovering, and reissuing keys. The client or 
provided service can perform the process of new public keys registration. If the client 
generates the key pair, then the client is required to provide or present the authenticity 
of their owning the private key to be able to register for public key. Regardless of 
whether the client or the provided service generates the key pair, KRSS provides 
mechanisms to authenticate clients. There are two services defined by X-KISS: locate 
service and validate service. The locate service allows a client to fetch information 
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about a public key or it allow a client to fetch a public key. The validate service allows 
a client to fetch information about a public key or it allow a client to fetch a public key 
but it confirms that the information returned matches specific validation rules. The 
<KeyInfo> element defined by XML Encryption is used to provide the data format that 
is used to communicate key information. 
 
Figure 2.18 illustrates how XKMS operates in steps. In figure 2.18, sender B target is to 
submit the encrypted document to sender A using the public key in possession. Though, 
sender B does not have sender A's public key. Although sender A has the public key 
registered using XKMS service, within the sender A's domain there is no trust 
relationship established between sender B and the XKMS service. This can be resolved 
by sender B contacting the validate service within sender B‘s domain, requesting a 
public key for sender A to be used in the encryption process. This request might be 
forwarded by the validate service to the locate service within sender A's domain. 
Validate service will validate the response within its own domain; validation process is 
performed before the sender B has the response returned. 
 
Figure 2.18: Obtaining a validated public key by sender B for sender A 
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2.6.4 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML stands for Security Assertion Markup Language (Cantor, Kemp, Philpott, & 
Maler, 2005). SAML defines the representation of security assertions within XML 
documents. An assertion process is a set of pre-defined statements, created by an 
assertion authority, which a relying party may trust. Figure 2.19 represents the assertion 
process, whereby the required assertion is identified by the issuer element. There are 
three statement types defined by SAML: authorization, authentication, and attribute 
statements. The same abstract type derives the three statement types, from which any 
additional statement types may be derived as well. Any number of statements can be 
included in a SAML assertion. In cases where the assertion has all three assertion types, 
it is necessary to indicate the subject type to which assertion type can be applied, in 
order to utilize the subject element. Subjects‘ confirmation methods can be specified by 
the subject element. Such methods can be used to ensure that the message origin is 
exactly from the subject identified in the assertion. There are many methods for subject 
confirmation (Hughes et al., 2005). Usually, the message is signed by the subject and by 
using a private key associated with the assertion. Signing the message can be performed 
by other applications‘ specific procedures. 
 
Figure 2.19: SAML assertion elements 
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2.6.5 XML Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
XACML stands for Extensible Access Control Markup Language and is an open 
standard XML-based language designed to explain the security policies and access 
privileges to data and information for digital rights management (DRM), web services, 
and enterprise security applications. XACML was first introduced by OASIS 
(Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) in 2003 
(Godik & Moses, 2003). The main objective of XACML is to set a basic standard for 
access control through XML language. 
XACML can work in conjunction with SAML, whereby a rule engine with policies 
expressed in XACML can compare such information with established criteria to 
ascertain user rights. 
Figure 2.20 illustrates the basic components of XACML. As seen in figure 2.20, the 
policy enforcement point and the policy decision point can be shared with SAML. 
 
 
Figure 2.20: XACML components 
 
An access request arrives for authorization at the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). An 
XACML request is created by the PEP and submitted to the Policy Decision Point 
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(PDP), which then evaluates all incoming requests and sends it back with responses 
(either accepted or denied).  
A decision is made by the PDP after evaluating the relevant policies and the rules 
within them. Not all policies are evaluated; only relevant policies are picked up for the 
evaluation process, which depends on the policy target.  
The Policy Access Point (PAP) is used by the PDP to fetch all policies, write policies 
and policy sets, and to ensure the policies are available to the PDP. In order to retrieve 
the attribute values associated with the subject, resources, or the environment, the PDP 
may invoke the Policy Information Point (PIP). The PEP fulfils the needed 
requirements once the authorization decision arrived at by the PDP either permits or 
denies access. 
 
2.7 Text Categorization 
Text categorization is the process of assigning text documents to a predefined set of 
categories/classes. There are two main phases involved in the categorization process: 
the training phase and the fuzzification phase. In the training phase, sets of documents 
belonging to each category are used to create representations of the categories. The 
classification phase compares the representations resulting from the training phase with 
a new document in order to assign a new document to one or more category. Many 
algorithms that can be used to perform the process of text categorization, including k-
nearest neighbour classification (kNN) (Guo, Wang, Bell, Bi, & Greer, 2006), support 
vector machines (SVMs) (Brank, Grobelnik, Milic-Frayling, & Mladenic, 2003), neural 
networks (Ng, Goh, & Low, 1997), linear least squares fit mapping (LLSF) (Yang & 
Chute, 1993), the vector space method (Gauch, Madrid, Induri, Ravindran, & 
Chadlavada, 2004), and naïve Bayes classification (NB) (McCallum & Nigam, 1998). 
 59 
(Yang & Liu, 1999) conducted a performance comparison of all these classification 
systems and found that SVMs and kNN significantly outperform all other classifiers. 
 
2.8 Fuzzy Logic Model 
Fuzzy logic (FL) was first introduced by (L.A. Zadeh, 1965). Fuzzy logic is based on 
multi-value logic, which allows intermediate values to be defined between conventional 
evaluations in the form of Yes/No, True/False, etc. Different concepts like ―very short‖ 
or ―rather slow‖ can be formulated in mathematical notations and processed by 
computers, in order to apply a more human-like way of thinking (L. A. Zadeh, 1984).  
 
FL provides a powerful method to reach a certain conclusion that is based on vague, 
uncertain, or noisy information. In order to make faster decisions, FL provides a 
mechanism to control problems. FL provides the ability to integrate rule-based approach 
(consist of IF X and Y THEN Z rules) to solving control problems. 
The FL approach provides essential information to assist financial decision makers in 
effectively measuring and identifying sensitive information, essential parts and 
important figures within financial transactions, more so than the existing qualitative 
approaches. This is because, using FL, the degree of importance within each financial 
transaction is quantified based on a combination of financial historical data and input by 
experts.  
Over the years, FL has been used to integrate expert input into computer models for a 
large scope of applications in different categories. The main advantage of the fuzzy 
methodology is that it enables the processing of ambiguously defined variables and 
variables whose relationships cannot be defined by any mathematical relationships. In 
order to define those variables along their relationships, fuzzy logic can incorporate 
expert human judgement for that purpose. 
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2.8.1 Fuzzy Sets and Crisp Sets 
The fuzzy subset is the basic concept of fuzzy systems. In mathematics, we call it a 
crisp set. Figure 2.21 illustrates the characteristic function of a crisp set. 
 
Figure 2.21: Characteristic function of a crisp set 
 
In figure 2.21, the elements that have been assigned the number 1 can be interpreted as 
the elements that are in set A, whereas the elements that have been assigned the number 
0 are the elements that are not in set A. This concept lacks flexibility for some 
applications. The upper range is difficult to define. So, the upper range is set to 0.2. 
Thus, we get B as a crisp interval defined as following: (B= [0, 0, 2]). However, this 
means that a value of 0.21 is not considered low while a value of 0.20 is considered 
low. To construct the set B in a more natural way is by relaxing the strict separation 
between low and not low. This can be achieved by allowing more flexible rules like 
"fairly low" rather than allowing only the crisp decisions. A fuzzy set will enable us to 
define such a notion.  
 
The intention is to utilize fuzzy sets to be able to make computers more 'intelligent'. 
And so, the idea above needs to be coded more formally. A straight method to 
generalize this concept would be to enable more values between 0 and 1. Actually, 
infinitely many choices could be permitted between the bounds 1 and 0, specifically the 
unit interval I = [0, 1]. A gradual membership is reflected by all other values to establish 
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B. This really is proven in figure 2.22. The membership function is a graphical 
representation of the magnitude of contribution of every input signal. It associates a 
weighting with all of the inputs which are processed, identifies functional overlap 
between inputs, and ultimately determines an output result. The rules utilize the input 
membership values as weighting factors to ascertain their influence in the fuzzy output 
sets of the final output conclusion. 
The membership function, functioning in this instance in the fuzzy set of interferometric 
coherence g, returns a value between 0.0 and 1.0. It's significant to indicate the 
distinction between probability and fuzzy logic. Both operate over exactly the same 
numeric range and have similar values: 0.0 represents non-membership (or False) and 
1.0 represents full membership (or True). However, there's a distinction to be made 
between the two statements. The probabilistic approach yields the natural language 
statement, "There is a 50% likelihood that g is low", as the fuzzy language corresponds 
to "g's degree of membership within the set of low interferometric coherence is 0.50." 
The semantic difference is critical: the first view supposes that g is or isn't low; the 
chance to know which set it is in is only 50%. Fuzzy terminology assumes that g is 
"more or less" low or, corresponds to the value of 0.50. 
 
Figure 2.22: Characteristic function of a fuzzy set 
 
2.8.2 Fuzzy Inference Process 
FL can allow the use of degrees of truth in order to calculate results. FL techniques 
allow one to represent concepts that could be considered to be in more than one 
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category. which means the representation of overlapping and partial membership in sets 
or categories is allowed (Bridges & Vaughn, 2001). There are four main steps involved 
in the FL inference process (Cox, 2001b), which are: 
 Step 1 (Fuzzification): Taking the crisp input X and input Y, the process 
determines the degree to which these inputs belong to and where they fit in the 
fuzzy set. 
 Step 2 (Rule Evaluation): Taking the fuzzy inputs, the qualified fuzzy rules are 
applied. Fuzzy operators (AND / OR) are used in case of any uncertainty to get a 
single value. The outcome value is called a ―Truth Value‖, which will be applied 
to the membership function for rule evaluation. 
 Step 3 (Aggregation of the Rule Outputs): The outputs of all the rules are 
unified. Scaled rules are combined into a single fuzzy set for each variable. 
 Step 4 (Transforming the Fuzzy Output into a Crisp Output): The output should 
have a clear, crisp value and it will be assigned to each tag classified. 
 
Figure 2.23: Fuzzy inference process 
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Figure 2.23 illustrates the FL inference process, showing the four major steps required 
to perform the FL inference lifecycle. 
Fuzzy logic is needed because of the ability that FL has to accept vaguely defined data. 
It has the ability to model non-linear functions of arbitrary complexity and can build on 
the experience of experts. 
 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the XML model and its basic components and the schema 
languages involved. This chapter also introduces the main XML security techniques that 
are utilized in XML security specifications. The XML security specifications published 
by W3C and OASIS are the core of XML security technology, such as XML 
Encryption. XML Encryption makes XML data confidential and it ensures this using 
XML Encryption technology.  
 
Text categorization has been discussed as well to describe the classification methods for 
the text documents and their associated algorithms to categorize data into relevant 
categories properly.  
Finally, fuzzy logic has been introduced to explain the methodology we are using in this 
research to identify how we will classify XML content and find the importance level for 
each tag included within the XML document. 
 64 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the most important XML encryption models. Models are the key 
factor inspiring and supporting this research. Classifying XML messages using fuzzy 
logic (FL) is the other key part of this research and is also discussed and analysed in this 
chapter. We explore existing XML encryption models and a list of the related works. 
 
3.2 XML Encryption Models 
Companies and financial institutions adopted XML as a standard in their data 
communication and exchanges among different platforms due to its independency, 
flexibility, and ability to enable custom structures and creations. XML documents are 
exchanged via variant communication mediums, which in some cases have weak 
security measurements; they may use unsecured channels or may even be hacked by an 
unknown party. XML documents are well known to be verbose, which make them 
readable by machines and humans as well. Any plaintext editor should be enough to 
read, modify, or change the contents to cause real damage.  
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Therefore, some XML encryption models have been proposed and published to ensure 
the confidentiality of transferred XML messages and to make sure they reach their 
destinations without any issues.  
 
(W3C, 2001) first published the XML Encryption Standard (XEnc) by describing the 
syntax needed to represent encrypted XML data and the process of encrypting and 
decrypting XML data. Data confidentiality is achieved by the XML encryption by 
hiding sensitive information so that it can only be understood by targeted recipients. 
The XEnc structure syntax is defined by using XML Schema.  
Element-wise encryption is the security provided by XEnc, where elements and content 
are integrated with each other. Due to the flexible and extensible nature, the XEnc 
standard can be used and processed by XML tools. However, it is impossible to expand 
their capability handling attribute encryption due to the current XML Encryption Syntax 
and Processing rules.  
 
(Maruyama & Imamura, 2000), (E & B, 2000), and (Takeshi & Hiroshi, 2000) have 
worked on XML element-wise encryption, which supports W3C in delivering a 
candidate specification for XML encryption (Imamura et al., 2002). The candidate 
specification specifies a process for encrypting data and representing the result of the 
encryption process in XML. Data might be in different format, for example it could be 
arbitrary data, XML elements, or XML element content.  
The encrypted data element is called <EncryptedData>. This element identifies the 
format of the encrypted data; the identification does not include user's ability to identify 
how the XML document is encrypted. It is impossible to handle attribute encryption due 
to the <EncryptedData> element's syntax.  
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(Ed, 2001) explained the attribute encryption as following: Elements and attributes are 
identified by XML for information structuring and applications that uses attributes in a 
frequent basis. Author urged the support of attributes encryption unless it is impossible 
to support.   
 
(Steve, 2001) explained the difficulty of redesigning a legacy application and XML 
vocabularies in cases of existing attributes containing data. Such redesigning can be 
onerous when there are pre-existing XML data and applications. The main goal is to 
find a simple yet effective way of handling the encryption of attribute data.  
(D. Fallside, 2001) presented some negative sides of attribute encryption that might 
trigger issues. The first possible issue is that the encrypted XML document cannot be 
validated against the original XML schema. This will result amending the original 
schema so that it can identify particular encrypted elements. Briefly, assuming an XML 
document (X) with its schema (S) defining both structure of the document and content. 
Next, the encrypted document (Xs) will not follow (S), because it is impossible to 
present XML encryption without schema changes during the encryption process, as 
described in (Blair, 2001) and (Ed, 2001). 
 
Without attribute encryption in XML, sensitive data cannot be stored securely in the 
attributes of XML documents. Also, we have to tell the users to redesign their legacy 
XML documents if they wish to apply XML encryption to them. We consider that the 
only acceptable reason for not including attribute encryption in XML is if it is 
impractical or impossible to do so. After much discussion about the requirements, 
complexities, and alternatives of attribute encryption, the working group decided to 
proceed under the requirement of element encryption while remaining open to further 
comment, experimentation, and specification of attribute-encryption proposals or 
 67 
alternatives that satisfy the requirement to encrypt sensitive attribute values (Joseph, 
2001). (Ed, 2001) also mentioned the possibility of leaving out attribute encryption until 
version 2.0 of XML encryption. 
 
(Geuer-Pollmann, 2002) proposed an encryption approach called pool encryption: the 
approach has the ability to remove sensitive information from the resulting file. Each 
XML document is parsed into a DOM tree for encryption purposes. DOM tree nodes 
are labelled, the corresponding node has the position information attached to it. Each 
node is individually encrypted whereby it has an encryption key specified for each 
node. These nodes are removed later from their unique position located in the source 
document and placed into a pool of encrypted notes.  
The pool of nodes can be stored either in different documents or in the source 
document; the choice will depend on the pre-defined security requirements. A unique 
node key is assigned to each node. The node keys are grouped into a pool of node keys 
to ease nodes management. The sender identifies the decryption competences of the 
different users by assuring that the recipient has the pool of node keys. The more keys 
the pool receives, the more nodes it can decrypt. The recipient will only be able to view 
parts within encrypted document taking into consideration the corresponding pool of 
node keys. This is because the pool is encrypted with the recipient‘s key before it is 
submitted to the recipient. Any node that does not match keys will be hidden and the 
recipient will not be able to view it. The individual nodes which have the bundled 
original position information uses this information during decryption process in order to 
restore any specific node back to its original position within the XML document. The 
pool encryption method is able to remove confidential information from the document; 
this method is also able to hide both the size and the existence of encrypted content. By 
performing this method, it prevents information leakage to unauthorized users to access 
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the document. However, there are number of disadvantages related to this method due 
to the change in the size of the encrypted document to prevent any traffic analysis 
attack. Disadvantages defined as following: 
 The encrypted document size is changed due to the pool of node keys. 
 Increase in encrypted document size due to added position information. 
 For each node, the encryption process and decryption process are executed 
separately. 
 Each node has to have a unique node key generated. 
 The original position information has to be attached to particular individual 
nodes. 
 At the contrary of the ordinary encryption/decryption processes, the process of 
reassembling and flattening nodes requires intensive resource usage. 
The above disadvantages cause high memory usage, large storage requirements, high 
bandwidth consumption, and high processor power consumption. 
(Rosario, 2001) introduced the concept of XML access control (XAC), which is a 
server-side access control whereby a trusted access control processor allows security 
policies and procedures to be established based on policies. XAC presents a way to 
control the access of users to specific portions of a full XML document that is stored on 
a server.  
XAC encrypts an XML element with the ability to exclude its descendants. This 
specific feature of XAC gives an advantage over XEnc because XEnc requires the 
encryption of a full sub-tree.  
XAC pruning process refers to the authorization of a user and in the next step it 
removes elements labelled with "deny (-)" from the tree.  
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Thus, it declines the requesting user from reading sensitive information and also it 
prevents the user from gaining information about any existing sensitive content. In 
brief, only elements with "permit (+)" labels remains in the resulting file. The pruning 
process is executed online at the same time the client issues a query (similar to SQL 
query). It is similar to XEnc but without encryption after pruning process. However, a 
form of additional security is needed (like SSL) to transmit the document in a secure 
mode to users. 
However, XAC restricts the user‘s access to a document. Some of the techniques used: 
mandatory access control, rule-based access control, access control list, discretionary 
access control, role-based access control, and lattice-based access control.   
Table 3.1 illustrates the three main XML encryption approaches with their advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Table 3.1: XML Encryption Approaches 
Approach Advantages Disadvantages 
W3C XML 
Encryption 
Standard (2001) 
 Only users that know 
the key can decrypt and 
read the message. Each 
recipient can only 
decrypt the parts of a 
message that are 
intended for them; they 
are unable to decrypt the 
rest. 
 EncryptedData is an 
XML element that 
replaces the data to be 
encrypted. The 
EncryptedData  and the 
 Unable to handle 
attribute encryption.  Leaves descendants 
visible.  Needs style sheets.  New recipients cannot 
be added without re-
encrypting the content.  Neither of DTD nor 
schema definition is 
encrypted, both are 
exposed to "plaintext 
attack". Therefore, 
there is a risk of 
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EncryptedKey are 
composed of other sub-
elements, such as the 
encryption method, key 
information, and cipher 
value. 
 The entire XML 
message or only some 
parts can be encrypted. 
 If both the sender and 
the receiver have not 
exchanged the keys 
previously, the key can 
be sent in the message 
encrypted using a public 
key system. 
information leakage. 
 
XML Pool 
Encryption 
(Christian Geuer-
Pollmann – 2002) 
 Uses a secure, complete 
sub-tree. 
 Has the ability to secure 
attribute values. 
 A new recipient can be 
added without re-
encrypting the content. 
 The original position 
information has to be 
attached to particular 
individual nodes. 
  The encrypted 
document size is 
changed due to the pool 
of node keys. 
 For each node, the 
encryption process and 
decryption process are 
executed separately. 
 Each node has to have 
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a unique node key 
generated. 
 Increase in encrypted 
document size due to 
added position 
information. 
 At the contrary of the 
ordinary 
encryption/decryption 
processes, the process 
of reassembling and 
flattening nodes 
requires intensive 
resource usage. 
XML Access 
Control (XAC) 
(Ricardo Rosario – 
2001) 
 Involves the automation 
of encryption/access 
decisions.  Attribute encryption is 
possible. 
 Needs additional 
transport security.  Needs trustworthy 
servers. 
 
3.3 Fuzzy XML Modelling 
Over the years, fuzzy systems have been used successfully in many fields to handle the 
imprecise and uncertain information that is commonly found in real-world applications, 
such as business and financial systems, data mining, and decision-making systems.  
(L.A. Zadeh, 1965) addressed the representation of fuzzy information with fuzzy set 
theory. Fuzzy set theory has been successfully identified as a working technique to 
model imprecise and uncertain data and it has been introduced into many application 
areas, such as business intelligence (Petrovic, Roy, & Petrovic, 1999; R. R. Yager, 
2000; Ronald R. Yager & Pasi, 2001) and database, semantic web, and information 
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systems (Galindo, 2008; Klir & Yuan, 1995; Lukasiewicz & Straccia, 2008; Ortega, 
2008; Smets, 1996).  
XML is not able to represent and process vague and unclear data. Currently, less 
research has been done on modelling and querying imperfect XML data. XML 
documents with incomplete information have been researched by (Serge Abiteboul, 
Segoufin, & Vianu, 2006) and probabilistic data has been researched by (Nierman & 
Jagadish, 2002). (Lee & Fanjiang, 2003) developed a fuzzy-object-oriented modelling 
technique based on the XML language to model requirement specifications and 
incorporated the notion of stereotypes to facilitate the modelling of imprecise 
requirements. 
(Gaurav & Alhajj, 2006) presented an approach to integrate fuzziness with XML. They 
base their approach on identifying possible entities in XML that might have fuzzy 
values. Their approach based on analysing XML document structure to identify which 
parts within the document that can be handled using fuzziness. They then specified the 
appropriate mechanism to integrate fuzziness. Their approach focused on XML being a 
structured (logical and physical) and well-formed language. They were interested in the 
logical structure as a key issue, defining the content (data) of an XML document. Then, 
they identified different parts of an element that can have fuzzy data. there are five 
items that might have fuzzy data: 1) simple elements ―text only‖; 2) complex or empty 
elements - the attribute value "val"; 3) complex element -only the element "val" and 
occurrence of <subElmt> within <elmt>; 4) complex or text only elements - attribute 
value "val" & "text"; 5) complex and mixed elements - attribute value "val", element 
content "text", and the occurrence of <subElmt> within <elmt>. This means that the 
elements content ―text‖, the attribute value "val", and the <subElmt> of an <elmt> 
might be fuzzy entities within an XML document. this is declared from their evaluation 
 73 
of including the attribute "val", fuzzy data, and element content "text" as they are 
similar in nature and are all equivalent, as opposed to the <subElmt> of an <elmt>. 
Therefore, there are two main categories of entities in an XML document that might be 
fuzzy: the first category is when having an element content "text", or the attribute value 
"val", and the sub-element <subElmt> of an element <elmt>.  
However, their approach does not tackle the production of nested, fuzzy XML schema 
or the provision of techniques to make vague queries on a vague XML document.  
 
(Ma & Yan, 2007) introduced a fuzzy XML data model to manage fuzzy data in XML, 
based on possibility distribution theory, by first identifying the multiple granularity of 
data fuzziness in UML and XML. A fuzzy UML data model and a fuzzy XML data 
model that address all types of fuzziness were developed. Further, the author developed 
the formal conversions from the fuzzy UML model to the fuzzy XML model, as well as 
the formal mapping from the fuzzy XML model to fuzzy relational databases. It is noted 
that the fuzzy extension of XML in the author‘s model only focuses on XML DTD, 
because it has traditionally been the most common method for describing the structure 
of XML instance documents. However, XML DTD lacks enough expressive power to 
describe highly structured data properly, and XML Schema provides a much richer set 
of structures, types, and constraints for describing data.  
 
(Tseng, Khamisy, & Vu, 2005) presented an XML methodology to represent fuzzy 
systems for facilitating collaborations in fuzzy applications and design. DTD and XML 
Schema are proposed to define fuzzy systems in general. One fuzzy system can be 
represented in different formats understood by different applications using the concept 
of XSLT style sheets. As an example, they represent a given fuzzy system in XML and 
transform it into comprehensible formats for Matlab and FuzzyJess applications.  
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(Tseng et al., 2005) methodological components consist of: a) an input base that 
consists of a collection of inputs (linguistic variables) containing terms and membership 
functions; b) a membership function repository that contains all the membership 
functions used to describe the fuzzy system; c) an inference engine that defines all 
operators used to perform inferencing; d) an operator repository that contains all the 
operators )―And‖, ―Or‖, ―Aggregations‖) used to describe the fuzzy system; e) a rule 
base that is a collection of fuzzy IF-THEN rules; f) defuzzification, which translates 
fuzzy set output values into crisp values; and g) an output base that consists of a 
collection of outputs (each being a linguistic variable data type).  
On the lower side of their methodology, (Tseng et al., 2005) proposed fuzzy system 
data types that consist of: linguistic variables, linguistic terms, membership functions, 
operators, and rules. They then proposed a DTD as a kind of schema to describe fuzzy 
systems in XML; one DTD is defined per component and main data type. Fuzzy system 
schema can also be used to define fuzzy systems in XML; they define an individual 
XSD for each major component.  
However, Tseng did not pay much attention to the design of reverse style sheets to 
transform fuzzy system descriptions in given software into an XML document that is 
compliant with their proposed XML schema.  
 
(Turowski & Weng, 2002) introduced a formal syntax for the important fuzzy data 
types that are used to store fuzzy information. They defined appropriate DTDs as they 
show how fuzzy information, whose description is based on these DTDs, can be 
exchanged between application systems by using XML. As a result, they introduced a 
better approach for business applications integration using fuzzy approaches to business 
application systems. This allows better collaboration with application systems and 
development tools that use fuzzy approaches. Their approach focuses on encapsulating 
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fuzzy information, and any related fuzzy data that describes fuzzy information in XML 
tags is named according to a standardized term set. By performing encapsulation, the 
messages that contain fuzzy information from other application systems get a meaning 
and can subsequently be processed. They defined a DTD as defining constraints on the 
logical structures of XML documents.  
 
(Zhang, Ma, & Yan, 2013) proposed an approach along with an automated tool called 
FXML2FOnto for constructing fuzzy ontologies from fuzzy XML models. They also 
investigated how constructive fuzzy ontologies may be useful for improving some fuzzy 
XML applications (i.e. reasoning in fuzzy XML models). They first proposed a 
definition of fuzzy XML models that includes the XML document structure‘s fuzzy 
DTDs and the XML document content‘s fuzzy XML documents. Based on this 
definition, they proposed an approach to constructing fuzzy OWL DL ontologies from 
fuzzy XML models.  
They used two key steps to construct the fuzzy OWL DL: first, transforming the fuzzy 
DTD into a fuzzy ontology at the structure level; second, transforming the fuzzy XML 
document into a fuzzy ontology at the instance level. They gave proof of the correctness 
of the transformation by providing a detailed construction example. Following the 
proposed approach, they implemented a prototype tool called FXML2FOnto, which 
automatically constructs fuzzy OWL DL ontologies from fuzzy XML models.  
In the final stage of their approach, they reduced reasoning in fuzzy XML models to 
reasoning in fuzzy OWL DL ontologies, so that by using existing fuzzy ontologies‘ 
reasoning, the reasoning of fuzzy XML models can be automatically checked. The 
reasoning results may provide several simple optimization steps in answering queries 
over a fuzzy XML document base. By using this approach, it is possible to improve 
some fuzzy XML business and financial applications. 
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(Herrera-Viedma, Peis, Morales-del-Castillo, Alonso, & Anaya, 2007) proposed an 
evaluation model for websites that are based on XML documents that are user centred 
and based on a fuzzy linguistic approach. The evaluation model consists of two 
components: an evaluation scheme that contains the evaluation criteria to be considered 
in the website quality evaluation; and a computing method of linguistic quality ratings. 
In the evaluation scheme phase, they analysed the information quality of websites from 
the information user‘s perspective, considering the following: a) different quality 
approaches to information quality; b) generating quality ratings on websites provided by 
evaluators; c) not including an excessive number of quality dimensions to avoid 
conflicting users; and d) analysing websites that store information in multiple types of 
documents structured in XML format (i.e. scientific articles). Based on these 
considerations, they defined a user-centric evaluation scheme of websites that 
anticipates four quality categories with the following evaluation dimensions: 1) intrinsic 
quality of websites; 2) contextual quality of websites; 3) representational quality of 
websites; and 4) accessibility quality of websites. The second component in their model 
is a computing method of linguistic quality rating that is used to evaluate the 
information quality of websites that are based on XML documents. Linguistic ratings 
are obtained from the linguistic evaluation judgements provided by a non-determined 
number of web visitors. After a visitor has used an XML document stored in a website, 
they are invited to complete a quality evaluation questionnaire as per the quality 
dimensions created in the evaluation scheme.  
Ratings of the linguistic quality are obtained by performing an aggregation function of 
the linguistic evaluation judgements by means of the LWA and LOWA operators, 
which are a linguistic family of OWA operators (R. R. Yager, 1988). These operators 
are used to allow inclusion of the concept of a ―fuzzy majority‖ (Herrera, Herrera-
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Viedma, & Verdegay, 1996) in the computation of the rankings. The ―fuzzy majority‖ is 
represented by the linguistic quantifier that is used to compute the weighting vector of 
the OWA operator.  
However, their model has the following limitations. First, it uses little information about 
web users; the model is designed to compute quality ratings only. Therefore, the 
performance could be improved if user profiles are used in the computation process of 
quality ratings. Second, it is a user-dependent model, so the quality of the websites can 
be evaluated only if users‘ perceptions can be gathered. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, we have presented various approaches to XML encryption standards. It 
discussed the capabilities, functions, and mainly primary criteria of the XML 
Encryption Standard.  
During the study of existing approaches, various issues have been addressed, such as 
super encryption, attribute value encryption, and other security issues. XML encryption 
models have been compared with one another. Implementations are considered as well 
for a few of the models. 
W3C may have to reconsider attribute value encryption, because it's not supported by 
the present XML Encryption Standard. If not, confidential information should be stored 
inside an element, consequently deprecating the use of attributes. 
We have evaluated the W3C XML Encryption Syntax and Processing rules. The 
security offered by XEnc is element-wise encryption, content and comprising elements. 
It may be utilized together with XML Signature. Its flexibility and extensibility enables 
XEnc to be processed and used by XML family tools. However, it is impossible to 
extend the capability of the current XML Encryption Syntax and Processing rules to 
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handle attribute encryption. We have also discussed XML access control (XAC) and 
made a comparison with XEnc: attribute encryption is possible in XAC. As its 
descendants can be excluded by the encryption of an element, XAC has greater 
flexibility over XEnc. This isn't permitted in XEnc as it requires the encryption of a 
complete sub-tree. However, XAC restricts the user‘s access to a document using 
several techniques, such as: discretionary access control, mandatory access control, 
role-based access control, rule-based access control, and lattice-based access control.  
Pool encryption has also been reviewed as one of the encryption models that are used to 
encrypt XML documents. XML pool encryption has the capacity of removing sensitive 
content from the encrypted XML document. However, this model introduces a number 
of disadvantages, like the increase in the size of the encrypted document due to added 
position information. Such disadvantages lead to high storage, high bandwidth and 
memory requirements, and high processor power consumption. 
Additionally, we have reviewed a number of fuzzy XML models and studies. Some of 
the studies tried to encapsulate fuzzy system descriptions in common elements that can 
be used to represent any fuzzy system. Some models proposed a DTD/XML schema to 
describe fuzzy systems in XML. Also, we have introduced studies presenting fuzzy 
XML data models that can be used to manage fuzzy data in XML, based on possibility 
distribution theory. Some models presented an approach to incorporating fuzziness in 
XML by identifying the possible entities in XML that might have fuzzy values. 
Potential entities that can handle fuzziness are identified by analyzing the XML 
document structure to incorporate fuzziness. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Intelligent Fuzzy-Based Financial XML Security 
Model 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter proposes a secure XML management model named SXMS. The model 
consists of two major parts. Each part has a discrete scope acting as an independent unit 
and forming an essential part of the whole system. Content is classified using a set of 
fuzzy classification techniques and encrypted using an element-wise encryption on 
selected parts within each XML message. This chapter also describes the combination 
of the model with XML message requirements and specifications. 
 
The proposed model has been designed based on two major phases, each with a discrete 
scope acting as an independent unit and forming an essential part of the whole system. 
Phase one of the proposed model involves performing a set of fuzzy classification 
techniques on the targeted XML messages. The fuzzy classification process is designed 
mainly to decide the similarity between the different standards within the same 
message. Basically the main target is to classify XML content to find out which parts 
are essential to have a specific security standards deployed. Upon fuzzy classification, a 
new value is generated and assigned to an existing XML tag. The XML tag named 
"Importance Level" will be used as an identifier for the next phase. The ―Importance 
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Level‖ tag presents a value which is used to identify the sensitivity level for the 
carrying tag and corresponding nodes. Phase two involves applying element-wise 
encryption to different parts within each XML message. Encryption could be for the 
whole message or elements of an XML message. The ―Importance Level‖ value 
assigned in phase one is also used to decide which type of encryption and key size is to 
be deployed. Element-wise encryption is based on W3C‘s recommendation (Maruyama 
& Imamura, 2000).  
 
4.2 Proposed Model for Securing XML Financial Documents  
This work presents a novel approach to securing XML financial messages by using a 
combination of fuzzy classification techniques and element-wise encryption. Main 
reason behind choosing FL technology for our classification stages is the ability of FL 
system to combine human expertise into computer-assisted decision making, facilitating 
more human-like decisions. FL is used in our proposed model to characterize XML 
message content sensitivity factors as fuzzy variables within each XML message, which 
determines the sensitivity level within the XML message to perform security measures 
on selected parts. The importance level rate for pre-selected nodes is a key factor to 
determine which encryption algorithm and keys are to be deployed. The importance 
level values are interpreted as "High", "Medium" or "Low".  
During the fuzzification phase, element-wise encryption is performed on selected parts 
defined in the previous phase. Encryption type and key size is selected based on the 
―Importance Level‖ value. AES symmetric encryption with a 256-bit key size is 
deployed on tags with an "Importance Level" classified with a "High" value, and AES 
symmetric encryption with a 128-bit key size is deployed on tags with an "Importance 
 81 
Level" classified with a "Medium" value. Tags with a "Low" value are forwarded to the 
message assembler without performing any kind of encryption.   
 
 
4.2.1 Model Requirements 
The system is designed to achieve a set of goals ensuring secure and efficient exchange 
of XML banking messages. The following requirements are needed to form the system 
core: 
 
1) Messaging interface: Defines the syntax and semantics for the outgoing financial 
XML messages and ensures that our model understands them fully. 
2) XML parser: Deciphers incoming XML messages to ensure they are fully 
understood prior to further processing. 
3) Valid XML message: Submitted messages should be valid in terms of message 
structure whereby it represents the schema defined in the originating channel. 
4) Stamped XML message: The first security layer which identifies that the 
incoming XML message is valid and from a trusted source. The stamp is added 
in the message header ensuring the originating channel, date of transmission, 
and service ID are all presented in a pre-defined sequence. 
5) Communication Port: A dedicated communication port needs to be used in our 
XML submission, which is different from the one used in service messaging. 
6) XML fuzzy classification characteristics: The 10 characteristics that define each 
transaction, each item should be available in the XML message; this will allow 
our system to build the classification criteria using our fuzzy classification 
phase. 
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7) Encryption algorithm: An encryption algorithm is needed to perform element-
wise encryption. The AES encryption standard is being used in our model; we 
have chosen AES encryption over other algorithms for the following reasons: 
 Fast deployment for encryption/decryption processes in both software 
and hardware. 
 AES uses three key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits. 
 Advanced Encryption Standard not only assures security but also 
improves the performance in a variety of settings such as smartcards, and 
hardware implementations. 
 Currently there is no known non-brute-force direct attack against AES. 
 However, this can be replaced with other symmetric encryption 
standards. 
 
8) Encryption Key Management: The encryption keys that are going to be used in 
our encryption phase must be managed. 
9) D-H Key Exchange: The ―public-key‖ or ―asymmetric‖ cryptographic keys must 
be utilized. 
10) Message assembler: To assemble different XML parts coming from different 
stages, encrypted or forwarded parts should be received and combined in one 
final message. 
 
4.2.2 System Architecture and Design 
Based on system requirements, the system architecture is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Major system components are described in details in figure 4.1. System modules act as 
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independent units whereby each unit can act as separate system; modules are combined 
to form SXMS 
 
Figure 4.1: Main system components 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the system architecture core is built based on two main 
modules forming the system core: 
 
A. Fuzzy Classification Module: In our fuzzy classification module, we categorized 10 
transaction characteristics into three different layers according to their type. The 
characteristics were chosen after exploring different experts‘ opinions and backgrounds, 
reviewing financial analysis tools, reviewing technical reports, researching different 
online and offline financial systems conducted within the financial institution, and 
performing a set of internal surveys among banking group heads. We categorized these 
10 transaction characteristics extracted from the XML message into three layers 
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(Account Segment, Details Segment, and Environment Segment).  Grouping will 
facilitate and simplify the process of fuzzy classification.  
This phase performed a set of intelligent fuzzy classification techniques to assign a new 
value to an existing tag within each XML message. We called the tag ―Importance 
Level‖, and the main idea is distinguish which parts of the XML message is to be 
encrypted using element-wise AES asymmetric encryption, and which parts are to be 
forwarded directly to the message assembler without further processing. The key size 
for AES encryption is dependent on the ―Importance Level‖ value assigned in this 
stage. The 10 characters are defined as follows: 
1) Transaction Amount: Financial institutions set pre-defined transaction limits. 
The limits allow users to perform transactions with specified limits on a daily 
basis. The range of transaction limits is defined based on the local policy within 
each institution. Banks normally treat the transaction amount as an alert to any 
critical transaction; the amount is used in most banks to measure the weight of 
the total transaction performed. Source, destination, and amount all combine to 
act as an alert which is already pre-defined based on the bank's policy. Large 
transaction amounts will affect the importance of the transaction itself, which 
can be used in our model as a measurement item in our importance-level 
evaluation. 
2) Transaction Currency: There is a well-defined list of allowed currencies 
that can be used online or offline. Each currency has its own set of risk 
variables depending on usage and importance. Foreign currency uses 
exchange rates, operational interference, and market value for the 
transaction the moment occurred. Banks treat each FX transaction with high 
importance, because it involves buying and selling with bank's rate. We 
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have used this factor in our importance evaluation. 
 
3) Account Type: Accounts are segmented within each institution. 
Segmentation is performed to enable application of a set of internal rules on 
selected segments. Each segment has its own value and weight, for example 
corporate account segments are listed with high importance and priority 
because most of the transactions involve large volumes which can benefit 
the bank for each transaction. We used this factor due to its role in deciding 
the importance level for the whole transaction. 
4) Transaction Notes: Exceptions are placed upon unusual activity on a 
specific account, and such exceptions will raise a flag in any transaction 
being processed to handle the exception before the process is completed. 
Having a flagged transaction will raise the importance level and trigger an 
alert to monitor that specific transaction due to its importance; we have used 
this factor to measure the importance level in terms of a transaction‘s critical 
weight. 
5) Profile ID: A unique identifier for the destination account owner, the value 
is set during the system integration and profile creation process. Companies 
or individuals with custom profile IDs have a high potential to be monitored 
for transactions, and monitoring is based on the transaction amount after 
classifying each profile ID whereby a range of IDs are listed in the high 
importance zone, all after deploying a bank's methods and procedures. 
6) Account Tries: How many times the account is used in the system; more 
usage means more trust whereby the history of the account is known and 
trusted. A historical log is kept and evaluated on a regular basis to confirm 
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trusted accounts and suspicious ones. The evaluation will result in a set of 
important ranges of trusted accounts to be used in the transaction evaluation 
and setting the importance level. 
7) Incorrect Password Tries: The number of times users try to enter the 
password incorrectly to complete the financial transaction. This factor adds 
a slight level of importance to each transaction, with a high rate of incorrect 
tries giving an indication of high importance. 
8) Time Spent on the Service: The time spent navigating the service before 
performing the transaction. The time range is set based on the bank‘s policy, 
taking into consideration peak hours. This factor considers technical factors 
to measure the importance level of the transaction which is based on non-
financial elements. 
9) Daily Transactions: How many transactions are performed before the 
financial transaction is carried out. The number of daily transactions puts a 
weight on the overall importance level for the transaction itself, whereby the 
number of transactions to be performed is set based on the bank's policy 
within the allowed ranges. 
10) Transaction Time: The financial day is categorized in three periods: peak 
period, normal hours, and dead zone. Periods are defined separately by the 
financial institution based on local policy and the historical transactions 
range. Each period has its own value which adds a level of importance and 
how the occurrence of any transaction is affected by the time of occurrence. 
Ranges are set to weigh an importance level when the transaction is 
performed. 
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B. Encryption Module: This module operates by performing an element-wise 
encryption using the AES encryption algorithm. Element-wise encryption is performed 
on selected portions of an XML document and their corresponding nodes defined 
previously in the fuzzy classification module. The encryption process can be applied to 
any number of elements whereby it is encoded using base64. Two key sizes are being 
used in this module, a 256-bit key and a 128-bit key, and usage depends on the 
―Importance Level‖ tag value classified earlier. Attributes with a value of ―High‖ are 
encrypted using a 256-bit key size, attributes with a value of ―Medium‖ are encrypted 
using a 128-bit key size, and finally the attributes with a value of ―Low‖ are forwarded 
directly to the message composition stage without performing any kind of encryption. 
 
C. Message Assembly Module:  This module is responsible for gathering all pieces 
together, all in sequence of arrival. Encrypted and non-encrypted parts are being 
assembled for final submission to the message destination channel. 
 
In chapter 5 we will test and evaluate above components. While we design the system, 
we took in consideration the following points: 
 Ability to test against main requirements, each requirement should be tested 
with ease. 
 System should be structured and well-defined. System code should be 
readable and easy to understand. 
 Ability to reuse components, system design should be reusable. 
 
4.3 Fuzzy Classification Methodology 
Methodology main technique involves the fuzzification of input variables based on 10 
characteristics extracted from the XML message, Figure 4.2 illustrates the whole fuzzy 
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classification process and internal stages, rule evaluation, aggregation of the rule 
outputs, and defuzzification phases are displayed. 
 
Figure 4.2: Fuzzy Inference System 
 
The fuzzy inference system involves four phases. A comprehensive description for each 
phase will be explained in order to understand main functionality behind each phase. 
Connection between each phase is described as well. 
 
4.3.1 Fuzzify Input Stage 
The first step is to take the inputs extracted from the 10 characteristics within each 
XML message and determine the degree to which they belong to each of the appropriate 
fuzzy sets via membership functions. The input is always a crisp numerical value 
limited to the universe of discourse of the input variable (in our case it is an interval 
between 0 and 10) and the output is a fuzzy degree of membership in the qualifying 
linguistic set (interval between 0 and 1). Fuzzification of the input amounts to a 
function evaluation. A decision mechanism for identifying importance-level values 
within each XML message will be provided. 
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We built this stage on three rules, and each of the rules depends on resolving the inputs 
into a number of different fuzzy linguistic sets: the factor is non-sensitive, the factor is 
normal, and the factor is sensitive. Before the rules can be evaluated, the inputs must be 
fuzzified according to each of these linguistic sets. For example, the transaction amount 
can range from "Non-sensitive" to "Sensitive" with other values being taken into 
account. The degree of membership decides the degree of belongingness of the values 
of variables to any class. We have designed a membership function for each 
transaction‘s characteristic indicator, which clearly defines how each input is mapped to 
a membership value between [0, 1]. Linguistic values are assigned to each transaction 
factor as non-sensitive, normal, and sensitive and for the final layer rate as High, 
Medium, and Low . Figure 4.3 represents an example of the linguistic descriptors used 
to illustrate one of the key transaction characteristics, transaction amount, with a plot of 
the fuzzy membership functions. The range of possible values for the corresponding key 
importance characteristic (Non-Sensitive, Normal, and Sensitive) is represented in x-
axis. The linguistic descriptor represents the degree to which a value for the importance 
level characteristic and it is represented in y-axis. 
 
Figure 4.3: Input variable for transaction amount factor 
Transaction Amount (Non-Sensitive, Normal, Sensitive) 
Linguistic Variable: Transaction Amount value 
Linguistic Value   Range (in Numbers) 
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Sensitive    [2000, 2500, 3000, 3000] 
Normal    [1500, 2000, 2500]  
Non-Sensitive   [0, 0, 1500, 2000] 
4.3.2 Rule Evaluation Stage 
The second step is to take the fuzzified inputs and apply them to the antecedents of the 
fuzzy rules.  If a given fuzzy rule has multiple antecedents, the fuzzy operator (AND or 
OR) is used to obtain a single number that represents the result of the antecedent 
evaluation. This number (truth value) is applied to the consequence membership 
function. Then we specify how the importance level probability is different as a 
function of the main importance level characteristic factors. A set of fuzzy rules are 
represented in form of (IF-THEN) statements and provided by experts; these statements 
connect to the importance level probability of different levels of importance 
characteristic factors based on previous experience. 
 
4.3.3 Aggregation of the Rule Output Stage 
This is the process of unification of the outputs of all the rules. It means we take the 
membership functions of all rules‘ consequents previously scaled and then combine 
them in one single fuzzy set. The list of scaled resulting membership functions is 
considered the aggregation process input, one fuzzy set for each output variable 
considered as an output. 
 
4.3.4 Defuzzification Stage 
This is the last step in the fuzzy inference model; the final output has to be a crisp 
number. The input for the defuzzification process is the aggregate output fuzzy set and 
the output is a number. We have conducted the Centroid technique in the 
defuzzification stage (Sugeno, 1985). This technique helps us to find the point where a 
vertical line would hit the aggregate set into two equal masses. The final output is the 
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importance level rate which is defined in fuzzy sets )―High‖, ―Medium‖, and ―Low‖). 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the final output ranges.  
Linguistic Variable: Importance Level    
Linguistic Value  Range (In Numbers) 
High   [6, 8, 10, 10] 
Medium   [3, 5, 7] 
Low    [0, 0, 2, 4] 
 
High: if the importance level of the tag is considered ―High‖, this will impact upon the 
overall transaction within the XML message. 
Medium: this might affect the overall transaction rate in some way; the content could be 
important for further attention.  
Low: with a low importance level, no impact is to be considered in the XML 
transaction. 
 
Figure 4.4: Output variable and ranges 
 
4.4 Fuzzy Classification Model 
In our fuzzy classification model, we categorize the 10 transaction field characteristics 
into three different layers (Transaction Layer, Details Layer, and Environment Layer) 
based on their nature among overall transaction type whereby each element within the 
layer has its own importance measures. To improve the final importance level rate 
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(fuzzy output), we have conducted a layering process for these features. Table 4.1 
illustrates the grouping mechanism and layering details based on XML message 
content. 
Table 4.1: XML message content components and layers  
Components Sequence  Layer Name Layer 
Transaction Amount 1 
Account 
Segment Layer 1 Transaction Currency 2 
Account Type 3 
Components Sequence  Layer Name Layer 
Account Tries 4 
Details 
Segment Layer 2 
Transaction Notes 5 
Profile ID 6 
Incorrect Password Tries 7 
Components Sequence Layer Name Layer 
Daily Transactions 8 
Environment 
Segment Layer 3 Transaction Time 9 
Time Spent on Service 10 
 
Figure 4.5 illustrates architecture design of the fuzzy inference classification model. As 
seen in the figure, each layer has an output which indicated that the tag rate that 
depends on the evaluation (fuzzy outputs) of the layer components. 
 
Figure 4.5: Classification Architecture of the importance level fuzzy mode (TAG 
Classification) 
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Our fuzzy classification model is performed based on three layers: Transaction Layer, 
Details Layer, and Environment Layer. Each layer has a set of components that are 
distributed based on the component nature and usage; the total number of components is 
10 and they are distributed among the three layers as follows: transaction amount, 
transaction currency, and account type are fitted in layer 1 (account segment layer); 
account tries, transaction notes, profile ID, and incorrect password tries are fitted in 
layer 2 (details segment layer); and finally, the daily transactions, transaction time, and 
time spent on site are fitted in layer 3 (environment segment layer). 
 
4.5 Fuzzy Rule Base and Layers Categorization  
4.5.1 Rule Base for Layer 1  
The rule base for layer 1 has three inputs and one output. The rule has all the "IF-
THEN" conditions of the system. For each entry of the rule base, each component is 
assumed to be one of the three values and each criterion has three components. This 
means that rule base 1 contains 27 entries (33). The output of rule base 1 is one of the 
importance level fuzzy sets (High, Medium, or Low) representing the account segment 
layer importance level. Table 4.2 illustrates a sample structure along with sample entries 
of rule base 1 for layer 1. 
Table 4.2: Rule base 1 for the account segment layer – layer 1 
Transaction 
Amount 
Transaction 
Currency Account Type 
Account Layer  
Importance Level 
Rate 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Normal Normal Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Normal Sensitive Normal Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive High 
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The system structure for the account segment layer is the result of joining the 
three basic components (transaction amount, transaction currency, and account 
type), which generates the layer importance level. Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 
illustrate the structure of the system and the three-dimensional surface structure, 
respectively. MATLAB R2010R has been used in the process. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Layer 1 system structure (inputs and outputs) 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Surface structure in a three-dimensional view for layer 1 
 
4.5.2 Rule Base for Layer 2  
The rule base for layer 2 has four inputs and one output. The rule has all the "IF-THEN" 
conditions of the system. For each entry of the rule base, each component is assumed to 
be one of the three values and each criterion has four components. This means the rule 
base for layer 2 contains 81 entries (34).  
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The output of rule base is one of the importance level fuzzy sets (High, Medium, or 
Low) representing the details segment layer importance level. Table 4.3 illustrates a 
sample structure along with sample entries of rule base for layer 2. 
Table 4.3: Rule base 1 for the details segment layer – layer 2 
Transaction 
Notes Profile ID Account Tries 
Incorrect 
Password Tries 
Details Layer 
Importance 
Level Rate 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
Normal Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
 
The details segment layer system structure is the result of joining the four basic 
components (transaction notes, profile ID, account tries, and incorrect password tries), 
which generates the layer importance level. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 illustrate the 
structure of the system and three-dimensional surface structure, respectively. MATLAB 
R2010R has been used in the process. 
 
Figure 4.8: Layer 2 system structure (inputs and output) 
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Figure 4.9: Surface structure in a three-dimensional view for layer 2 
4.5.3 Rule Base for Layer 3 
The rule base for layer 3 has three inputs and one output. All of the "IF-THEN" 
conditions of the system reside within the rule. Each component of each entry of the 
rule base is assumed to have one of the three values. This means the rule base has 27 
entries (3³). The rule base output is one of the importance level fuzzy sets (High, 
Medium, or Low) representing the environment segment layer importance level. Table 
4.4 illustrates a sample structure and sample entries of the rule base for layer 3. 
 
Table 4.4: Rule base 1 for the environment segment layer – layer 3 
 
Time on Site Daily Transactions 
Transaction 
Time 
Environment 
Layer 
Importance Level 
Rate 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Normal Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
 
The system structure for the environment segment layer is the result of joining the three 
basic components (Time on Service, Daily Transactions, and Transaction Time), which 
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generates the layer importance level. Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 illustrate the structure 
of the system and the three-dimensional surface structure. MATLAB R2010R has been 
used in the process. 
 
Figure 4.10: Layer 3 system structure (inputs and output) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Surface structure in a three-dimensional view for layer 3 
 
 
4.6 Encryption Model  
 
4.6.1 Element-wise Encryption  
In the previous step, we conducted fuzzy classification techniques on the XML 
messages in order to classify the included tags. The main idea of the process is to 
distinguish between the sensitive parts that require the deployment of security measures 
and the other parts that need no processing. Therefore the second phase in our model is 
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to apply element-wise encryption on the classified parts within each XML message. 
Element-wise encryption was first introduced by (Maruyama & Imamura, 2000). Figure 
4.12 illustrates the system structure when deploying element-wise encryption on 
selected parts. 
 
Figure 4.12: Encryption module architecture and design 
 
 
As displayed in Figure 4.12, the tags with an importance level of ―High‖ or ―Medium‖ 
are being encrypted using different keys depending on the importance level value, and 
tags with an importance level of ―Low‖ are being forwarded without any need of 
encryption. 
 
4.6.1.1 Element-wise Encryption Standard 
In order to deploy element-wise encryption on selected parts within XML message, the 
following list of requirements need to be fulfilled first: 
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1. Element-wise confidentiality: Elements within the XML document should be 
able to be encrypted. Elements might enclose different types; the remaining 
parts of the XML document should remain in plaintext. 
2. The encrypted document should be well-formed: the resulting document (after 
encryption has been deployed on the selected parts) has to be a well-formed 
XML document. Encryption can be nested within the document. 
3. The same set of basic information items must be exactly provided as the original 
document (when decrypting an encrypted document). Comments can be ignored. 
CDATA and entity references sections are not preserved. 
4. Independence from encryption algorithm: symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
must be supported, whereby the encrypted elements syntax should be isolated 
from the encryption algorithm used. 
5. Flexible key delivery mechanism: Two main key exchanges should be 
supported, the first is the certificate-based key exchange (encryption key is 
embedded in the syntax) and the second is the out-of-band key exchange (no key 
elements are embedded in the syntax). 
6. Content independency: the outer text should not play a role in decrypting the 
encrypted parts. For instance, the character encoding for the outer context might 
be changed without affecting the encrypted document content. 
7. Verification and validation by receiver: the incoming decrypted XML document 
should be validated by the receiver. 
8. Intermediary validation: this refers to the ability of an intermediary to validate 
the encrypted document without the decryption keys and without the need to 
decrypt the element. No need to validate the included content models, but the 
validation of any outer text. 
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9. Content model confidentiality: it should be feasible to maintain the content 
model of the encrypted data confidential. By knowing the content model of the 
element, there is a good chance to have an idea of which element to attack (if the 
XML document has multiple encrypted elements). 
 
Figure 4.13 illustrates a sample XML message after the fuzzy classification phase is 
performed, showing the ―Importance Level‖ attribute values. 
 
Figure 4.13: Classified XML message to be encrypted using element-wise encryption 
 
Figure 4.14 illustrates the same XML message after element-wise encryption is 
deployed. The tag attribute marked with a ―Low‖ importance level will have no 
encryption deployed, while the tags with an ―Importance Level‖ value of ―High‖ or 
―Medium‖ will be encrypted using the AES encryption algorithm. 
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Figure 4.14: XML message after deploying element-wise encryption on selected parts 
 
4.6.1.2 Design Consideration 
All of the fuzzy rules employed in our fuzzy classification model were obtained based 
on our banking and financial expertise, combined with financial experts knowledge and 
supported by a set of experimental stages empowered by real life examples. Next we 
will show all fuzzy rules for all XML content characteristics. 
1. Element serialization: XML documents (with sub-elements) need to be 
converted into a byte sequence before encryption because the AES encryption 
algorithm (which is used in our model to encrypt the selected tags) treats the 
inputs as a byte sequence. Our conversion tries to minimize the loss of any non-
essential information during the encryption process, like DOCTYPE declaration, 
use of namespace prefixes, and character encoding of the document. In our 
encryption phase we preserve the XML information set during the serialization 
operation by using canonical XML (W3C, BOYER, EASTLAKE, & REAGLE, 
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2002). We use C14N because of the implementation language independency. 
Encryption and decryption processes can be achieved in normal ways once the 
element is converted into byte array. 
2. Packaging encrypted elements in XML: when inserting the encrypted elements 
(binary data) into an XML document, Base64 is used as a text encoding method. 
Additionally, it is necessary to attach additional information for the decryption 
process like initialization vector, encryption algorithm, and keys. Usage of an 
existing cryptographic message would alleviate the burden of having security 
flaws. 
The cryptographic message format that is used in S/MIME (PKCS7/CMS) 
considered one of the most popular formats. In S/MIME, the encrypted process 
is performed by packing the cipher text alongside related information in a single 
MIME entity (media type should be application/pkcs7-mime). It can be included 
in an XML document in one of the standard ways to embed MIME objects. 
Child nodes related to the parent tag are also encrypted using the same level of 
encryption. Child tags‘ behaviour is taken from the parent "Importance Level" value. In 
Figure 4.14, tags (Transaction Amount, Currency, and Account Type) are encrypted 
using AES encryption with a 128-bit key size as per their parent "Account" layer. 
Basically we inherit the encryption behaviour from parent to child as per our 
categorization process. 
 
4.6.1.3 XML Message Schemas 
Syntax: Schema for XML core encryption, Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 
illustrate XML schema for core encryption and other sub elements. 
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Syntax: Schema for XML core encryption 
 
Figure 4.15: XML Schema for core encryption 
 
Syntax: Schema for the EncryptionInfos Element 
 
Figure 4.16: XML schema for EncryptionInfos element 
 
Syntax: Schema for the KeyValue Element 
 
Figure 4.17: XML schema for KeyValue element 
 
Syntax: Schema for the ContentEncryptionMethod Element 
 
Figure 4.18: XML schema for the ContentEncryptionMethod
 
element 
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Syntax: Schema for the Reference Element 
 
Figure 4.19: XML schema for the Reference element 
 
 
Syntax: Schema for the EncryptedContent Element 
 
Figure 4.20: XML schema for the EncryptedContent element 
 
4.6.2 Diffie–Hellman key exchange  
The DH Algorithm, first introduced by (Diffie & Hellman, 1976), was the first system 
to utilize "Public-key" cryptographic keys. We used the DH system because of its 
ability to manage public keys easily. As we use symmetric encryption "AES" with 
different key sizes, both sides of the communication must have identical keys. Securing 
the submitted keys has been an issue, so we use our model (symmetric-based encryption 
system) to encrypt the XML documents and DH system (asymmetric-based system) to 
encrypt the symmetric keys for distribution. In brief, we use the DH algorithm for 
public key exchange. 
 
4.6.2.1 D-H Process: 
We use Diffie-Hellman to secure exchanged keys, not the actual content which is 
already encrypted using our element-wise encryption module. To achieve the efficient 
exchange, we create a shared secret key, which we call "Key Encryption Key - KEK", 
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between the two entities (the sending channel and the receiving channel). Later the 
shared secret key encrypts the symmetric key for secure submission. The resulting 
symmetric key is called the traffic encryption key (TEK) for the data encryption key 
(DEK). This means KEK secures the delivery of TEK, while TEK provides the secure 
delivery of the XML document itself. 
The process starts just after the generation of private keys by each side (sending and 
receiving channels).  Each side then generates a public key, which is derived from the 
private key because both keys are mathematically linked. Then the two entities (sender 
channel and receiver channel) exchange their public keys. Each side now has its own 
private key and the other entity public key. 
 
During the key exchange process, the DH protocol generates "shared secret" keys that 
are identical and shared by both entities. A set of mathematical operations are 
performed against the sender's private key and the receiver's public key which generate 
a value. The reverse process (performing mathematical operations against the sender's 
public key and the receiver's private key) is performed to generate another value. The 
two values should be identical. The combination of the two values is called the "Shared 
Secret" which encrypts the information between the two entities.  In our model, the 
shared secret of the Diffie-Hellman protocol encrypts a symmetric key for our AES 
encryption algorithm, transmits it securely, and the distant end decrypts it with the 
shared secret. Figure 4.21 shows how the DH process operates. The sender is the one 
who actually generates and transmits the symmetric key in most cases. However, it can 
be handled by both sender and receiver. 
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Figure 4.21: Key exchange using the DH method 
 
As seen in figure 4.21, we require two large numbers, one prime (P), and (G), 
which is a primitive root of (P). P should be at least 512 bits. In stage 2 we 
compute public values for both sender and receiver (A, B) using: 
 Where X is the generated number by sender in stage 1 
  Where Y is the generated number by receiver in stage 1 
Now we compute the shared and secret keys by applying: 
Ka = Bx (mod p) Where Ka is the secret key for sender 
Kb = Ay (mod p) Where Kb is the secret key for receiver  
 
 
Figure 4.22 represents the DH key agreement schema. 
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4.7 Message Utilization 
Message security is the main concern to be handled in our model. However, 
deploying our framework will enable us to utilize outgoing messages and save 
resources by reducing outgoing messages. Figure 4.23 illustrates how the outgoing 
messages are utilized whereby only essential parts are being secured; other parts are 
just forwarded to the message assembler without the need for any type of 
processing.  
 
Figure 4.23: Message utilization 
 
Once the utilization process is completed, messages are ready for final submission 
to the selected destination.  
 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
A novel approach for securing financial XML messages using intelligent mining 
fuzzy classification techniques has been proposed. This approach will secure 
financial XML messages using element-wise XML encryption, fuzzy classification 
techniques that allow us to classify XML messages on the fly without the need to 
define a set of rules prior to the process.  
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Mining fuzzy classification techniques have been used to evaluate and measure the 
data sensitivity level within each XML message to find a degree of sensitivity for 
each tag in the XML message. The mining fuzzy classification process allowed us 
to assign a value to a new attribute added to the parent XML nodes. A value is 
determined by applying a set of fuzzy classification processes based on Mamdani 
inference (Mamdani & Assilian, 1975). A new value has been used to determine 
which type of encryption algorithm is being performed on selected tags, allowing us 
to secure only the needed parts within each message rather than encrypting the 
whole message. XML encryption is based on W3C XML recommendations. Nodes 
that are assigned an importance level value of "High" will be encrypted using the 
AES encryption algorithm with a 256-bit key size to ensure maximum security. 
Nodes that are assigned an importance level value of "Medium" will be encrypted 
using the AES encryption algorithm with a 128-bit key size. An implementation 
was performed on a real-life environment using online banking systems to 
demonstrate its flexibility, feasibility, and functionality. There are many possible 
directions for future work which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
SXMS Model Implementation and Testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presents the main system components, system functionalities, and 
implementation tools that have been used to evaluate our secure XML management 
model. We also illustrate the detailed testing of SXMS model in general and the testing 
of the main parts of the SXMS model in specific. The testing strategy will involve 
testing each stage on its own. Additionally, we present the XML sample set extracted 
from our collected financial messages which have been used in our testing and 
evaluation stages. Finally, we summarize and conclude the chapter. 
 
5.2 Development Architecture and Used Tools 
 
5.2.1 Used Tools 
System designed to achieve set of goals ensuring secure and efficient exchange of XML 
financial messages among different systems. Following measures are key factors in 
system design: 
1- Technical Computing (MATLAB R2010a): Since we are performing fuzzy 
classification, we require a high-performance language for technical computing. 
It has the capability to integrate computation, visualization, and plotting of 
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functions and data. Also it allows interfacing with other applications written in 
other programming languages such as Java, C, and C++. In our case we require 
the integration with our Java application that is used to encrypt classified 
documents. Solutions are presented in an easy to understand and familiar 
mathematical notation. 
2- Stylus Studio 2011 XML Enterprise Suite: Dealing with XML documents is the 
core of our model, since the files are in XML format we require an easy way to 
edit and manipulate XML files, XML schemas, and DTD codes.  This tool 
allows us to check the validity of XML files, XML well-formedness checking, 
and parsing as well. Also we require the ability to edit XML schemas, DTD with 
inline capability. 
3- Netbeans IDE 7.0: Our fuzzy classification module is built using Java J2EE, 
Netbeans Integrated development environment (IDE) is a platform framework 
for Java applications. The NetBeans Platform is a reusable framework for 
simplifying the development of Java Swing desktop applications. The NetBeans 
IDE bundle for Java SE contains what is needed to start developing NetBeans 
plugins and NetBeans Platform based applications. 
4- Microsoft Office Excel is used as a graphical and chart presentation, as we will 
compare models and present results in graphical presentation. Excel allows us to 
have a clear and easy to understand presentation with measures presented on the 
graph. 
 
5.2.2 Development Architecture 
Our proposed secure XML management system has the ability to extract all of the 10 
transaction characteristics and patterns for each XML transaction. Our fuzzy 
classification module main functionality is to classify XML messages based on these 
 111 
characteristics and by deploying Mamdani fuzzy system. Once classified, the fuzzy 
classification module will assign a value to the "Importance Level" tag within the 
messages. Classified messages are being processed by our encryption module to 
perform element-wise encryption on selected classified parts.  
 
System design includes three primary parts all of which signifies a crucial element of 
the requirements need. Those parts are: 
 Parsing incoming XML messages: to check for validity and well-formedness by 
using XML Sax parser. In case of any issues, messages should be handled by 
error handler component for either return an error code or halt the operation. 
 Classifying valid XML messages: fuzzy classification is done by using the 
fuzzification of input variables that is based on 10 characteristics extracted from 
the XML message. 
 Routing messages: messages are being routed either to final message assembler 
or to the XML encryption phase. 
 Encrypting incoming messages where "Importance Level" tag is labelled with 
"High" or "Medium": Tags with "Importance Level" set to "High" are being 
encrypted using 256-bit key, tags with "Importance Level" set to "Medium" are 
being encrypted using 128-bit key. 
 Private Key Exchange: using Diffie-Hellman private key exchange to exchange 
keys between sender and receiver. 
 
In this chapter, a set of testing and evaluation for the above listed components will be 
performed. During our design and development we took the following measures into 
consideration: 
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Reusability: ability to reuse included components or the system in complete. 
Testability: ability to test the system against requirements. 
Structured: ability to read code and structure easily. 
Figure 5.1 presents the development architecture and design.  
 
Figure 5.1: Model development architecture 
 
5.3 System Implementation 
 
5.3.1 SXMS Implementation Requirements 
Table 5.1 represents the minimum software and hardware requirements needed for 
NetBeans IDE 7.0 and Stylus Studio 2011 XML Enterprise Suite to perform system 
testing and implementation. 
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Table 5.1: Minimum hardware requirements to run main tools 
Operating System Microsoft Windows 7 – Ultimate edition, 64-bit / SP1 
Environment Java Development Kit JDK v7.0 
Processor PC / Intel based technology 2.0 MHz or faster 
processors 
Memory 512 MB of RAM 
Disk Space 750 MB of free disk space 
Display 1280x 768 px 
Drive DVD Drive 
  
5.3.2 SXMS Implementation Process 
Based on approaches in Chapter 4, SXMS fuzzy classification module generates on-the-
fly fuzzy classification value; this value is assigned to the Importance Level attribute in 
each XML message. The major steps for the fuzzy classification module are shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Process for XML data fuzzy classification 
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Step 1: This is the process of generating membership values for a fuzzy variable using 
membership functions. The first step is to take the crisp inputs from the 10 
characteristics which stamp the importance level and determine the degree to which 
these inputs belong to each appropriate fuzzy set. 
 
Step 2: The fuzzified inputs are applied to the antecedents of the fuzzy rules. Since the 
fuzzy rule has multiple antecedents, the fuzzy operator (AND or OR) is used to obtain a 
single number that represents the result of the antecedent evaluation. 
 
Step 3: This is the process of unification of the outputs of all the rules. In other words, 
we are combining the membership functions of all the rules‘ consequents previously 
scaled into single fuzzy sets (output). Thus, input of the aggregation process is the list 
of scaled consequent membership functions, and the output is one fuzzy set for each 
output variable. 
 
Step 4: This is the last step in the fuzzy inference process, where a fuzzy output of a 
fuzzy inference system is transformed into a crisp output. The input for the 
defuzzification process is the aggregate output fuzzy set where the output is a number. 
Centroid technique (Cox, 2001a) has been used to complete this step. 
The encryption process starts just after the fuzzy classification phase, Figure 5.3 
illustrate the encryption process deployment which consists of three steps. 
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Figure 5.3: Process for XML data encryption 
 
Step 1: This is the process of reading the value of the crisp output. Crisp output is the 
XML tag named ―Importance Level‖ classified in the previous fuzzy classification 
process; output has one of the values (Low, Medium, and High). 
 
Step 2: This process involves performing AES encryption on the coming XML Tags 
has an ―Importance Level‖ value of ―Medium‖ or ―High‖. Values set to ―Medium‖ will 
be encrypted using AES-128 bit key, values set to ―High‖ will be encrypted with 256-
bit key. 
 
Step 3: This process involves redirecting message content that need no further 
processing into message aggregator for final message assembly. 
 
5.4 Testing Strategy 
For the purposes of testing SXMS complete model, the testing strategies are to be 
identified first. The next sections describe the performance testing strategy used and 
then the functional testing strategies. 
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5.4.1 Testing SXMS Behaviour 
First we defined the state diagram in order to describe the behavioural activities of 
SXMS. State Figure 5.2 illustrates the behaviour state. 
Testing Strategy
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
Phase
Phase B Phase C Phase DPhase A
Phase EPhase FPhase GPhase H
Phase I
 
 
Figure 5.4: Model behaviour states 
 
Phase-A: This phase is the GUI of the designed model. It represents the 
starting phase in order to deal with all the other phases. This phase has two 
outputs: 
Out-1: to form an XML document, go to phase-B. 
Out-2: to handle invalid XML document, go to phase-F.  
Phase-B: This phase represents the process of parsing incoming XML 
documents. It has two outputs: 
Out-4: to classify valid XML message, go to phase-C. 
Out-5: to re-construct invalid XML message, go to phase-F. 
Phase-C: This phase represents the process of classifying incoming XML 
messages using Mamdani fuzzy inference system and it has three 
outputs: 
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Out-6: Classified tags whereby Importance Level assigned value set to 
―High‖, go to phase-D. 
Out-7: Classified tags whereby Importance Level assigned value set to 
―Medium‖, go to phase-E. 
Out-8: Classified tags whereby Importance Level assigned value set to 
―Low‖, go to phase-G. 
Phase-D: This phase represents the process of encrypting XML tags 
marked with ―High‖ importance level using 256 -bit AES encryption 
and it has two outputs: 
Out-9: Encrypted tags using 256-bit key, go to phase-G. 
Out-10: Generated private key, go to phase-I. 
Phase-E: This phase represents the process of encrypting XML tags 
marked with ―High‖ importance level using 128 -bit AES encryption 
and it has two outputs: 
Out-11: Encrypted tags using 128-bit key, go to phase-G. 
Out-12: Generated private key, go to phase-I. 
Phase-F : This phase represents the process of handling incoming error 
cases from different phases and it has two outputs: 
Out-13: rejected XML message, go to phase-A. 
Out-14: message to be modified or re-phrased, go to phase-B. 
Phase-G: This phase represents the process of aggregate and assembles 
incoming XML tags from different phases for final composition and it 
has one output: 
Out-15: successfully assembled message, go to phase-H. 
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Phase-H: This phase represents the process of message submission to final 
and it has one output: 
Out-16: Message for final submission, submitted successfully. 
Phase-I: This phase represents the process of exchanging private keys 
between sender and receiver and it has one output: 
Out-17: Private keys for receiver. 
 
5.4.2 Testing SXMS’s Functionality 
White-box and Black-box testing (IEEE, 1990) have been conducted to test the 
functionality of SXMS. The following describes both white-box and black-box testing 
steps: 
5.4.2.1 White-box Testing 
For our white-box testing strategy, all subroutines in our system were tested carefully 
by checking every statement written. Therefore, different types of XML documents 
were tested to guarantee all decisions, loops, nested loops, paths, and data structure 
have been tested. To facilitate the testing for better tracking our testing strategy, we 
have divided SXMS into two main sub-systems: XML Classifier, and XML Encryptor. 
Later we have divided each sub-system into smaller units to follow the unit testing. We 
have used white-box testing for the following types: 
1- Unit testing (IEEE, 1990): In this testing we performed white-box testing on 
each unit and associated sub-units. Test cases have been written to make sure the 
coding is deployed correctly for further integration. We have performed this 
testing in an accurate way as we eliminated more than 60% of system bugs 
during this testing. 
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2- Integration Testing: in this testing we tested and evaluated the interaction 
between units and sub-units, interfaces between the different units are examined 
carefully based on test cases created earlier, some of the test cases can be used 
as black-box test cases as well. 
3- Regression testing: we have performed a selective retesting of a set of 
components, sub-components, or the whole system. testing have been deployed 
to make sure that modifications have not caused a major effects on system 
behaviour, also to make sure that the system still complies with the requirements 
we defined (IEEE, 1990). 
 
5.4.2.2 Black-box Testing 
Although black-box testing is performed when the system is intended to be published or 
distributed, we performed the black-box testing to determine whether or not the system 
does what it supposed to do based on the functional requirements we defined. In our test 
we attempts to find errors and issues in external behaviour in the following categories 
(Pressman, 2009): (1) incorrect or missing functionality; (2) interface errors; (3) errors 
in data structures used by interfaces; (4)behaviour or performance errors; and (5) 
initialization and termination errors. 
In our black-box testing a different specialist performed the testing knowing main 
functionality of system but without knowing all details. The following types are the 
black-box testing strategy types we adopted: 
Integration testing: same as white-box integration testing but without knowing internal 
procedures and lifecycle. Testers performed their testing based on system functionality 
following provided work flow. Verification has been made that different units work 
together without issues and they are integrated into a larger code base. 
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Functional and system testing: we examined the high-level designs. Our functional 
testing involved ensuring that the functionality specified in the requirement 
specification works as it meant to be. System testing involves measuring the system in 
many different environments to ensure the program works in typical financial 
environments with different types of operating systems. 
Acceptance testing: testing was made based on end-user expectations of the 
functionality. Such testing is performed to decide whether or not the system satisfies the 
acceptance criteria. Test cases were pre-specified and given to the testing team. 
 
5.5 Testing Validation  
In this research, we have assembled a testing framework whereby it can evaluate the 
encryption part of our model against the well-known W3C Encryption standard (W3C, 
2001). To evaluate the effectiveness of our fuzzy XML encryption model, we have used 
this framework as measuring tool. We have selected data set from one of the electronic 
channels, which is the internet banking service in Jordan Ahli Bank (one of the leading 
banks in Jordan). The main goal of our testing against W3C Encryption standard is to 
prove the effectiveness of using SXMS model as a secure XML management tool for 
financial messages. Table 5.2 illustrates the factors we use in our testing and evaluation. 
 
Table 5.2: Testing Factors 
Module Testing Factors 
SXMS – Fuzzy Classification Model 
 Efficiency classifying XML 
messaging   Functionality test 
SXMS – XML Encryption 
 Improve encryption processing 
time  File size reduction for encrypted 
files 
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5.6 Testing Environment  
All experiment tests are performed on a PC (Intel core i5) 2.3 GHz CPU, 6.00 GB 
RAM, running Windows 7 Ultimate 64-bit operating system. NetBeans IDE 7.0 is used 
to implement SXMS model, and Stylus Studio 2011 XML Enterprise Suite is used as an 
XML editor and validator. 
 
5.7 Testing Data Preparation  
We have used two sets of data in our implementation and testing: A sample of 1,000 
financial XML messages and a sample of 1,500 financial XML messages representing 
an internet banking service, messages extracted from Jordan Ahli Bank (JAB, 2013), 
one of the leading banks in Jordan. Sample has been taken for a period of seven months 
extracted randomly; we choose Jordan Ahli Bank as a source of our sample since the 
information is accessible due to our working nature within the bank and concerned 
departments. The extracted sample contain massive amount of historical transactions 
reflecting our need to test the model. Sample has the transaction amount recorded, 
transaction time, logged IP address, account tries, and other details used to build our 
fuzzy classification layers. 
 
The collected dataset of 2,500 XML messages presenting the periods: three months 
(starting January 2010 until March 2010) for the first sample, and four months (April 
2010 until August 2010) for the second sample of data. Both samples covered the 10 
fuzzy classification characteristics we defined in our model. We have collected our 
samples on CD's in XML format; we arranged the documents and renamed each file to 
reflect the sample name and date of the transactions.  
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Figure 5.5: Sample data captured from the first set 
 
Figure 5.6: Sample data captured from the second set 
 
As seen in figure 5.5, and figure 5.6, the two sample sets contain large amount of data 
extracted from the transaction files and arranged in two separate files. Each file has 
number of columns presenting the raw value that is captured during the transaction. 
However, we only used the 10 characteristics defined earlier to be used in our fuzzy 
classification stage.  
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5.8 Fuzzy Classification and Encryption Testing 
5.8.1 Testing Fuzzy Classification 
We have developed two implementations of the fuzzy classification model. The first 
implementation is using the first set of XML transactions presenting the internet 
banking service. We have selected internet banking service because it uses XML as the 
main messaging for data exchange between back-end host and the front-end. System 
has been deployed as a middleware connected to the application backend. Few 
customizations have been placed to match XML message structure; mapping took place 
as well for final message fuzzy classification . 
Phase 1:  First implementation conducted using a sample of 1,000 records; Records 
have been selected randomly presenting various transaction types like money transfers, 
fund transfer, and wire transfer for a period of seven months. System classified sample 
messages into three layers depending on 10 characteristics described in chapter 4. A 
sample of the structure and the records of the rule base for layer 1 are shown in Table 
5.3. System main structure for layer 1 is the combination of Transaction Amount, 
Transaction Currency, and account type. The rule base contains (3³) which are 27 
entries and the output of this rule base is one of the Importance Level attribute fuzzy 
sets (High, Medium, Low) for layer 1. 
Table 5.3: Sample of data classified for Layer 1 
Transaction 
Amount 
Transaction 
Currency Account Type 
Account Layer  
Importance Level 
Rate 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Normal Sensitive Medium 
Normal Normal Normal Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive High 
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Same implementation sample has been conducted, a sample of the structure and the 
records of the rule base for layer 2 are shown in Table 5.4. System main structure 
for layer 2 is the combination of Transaction Notes, Profile ID, Account Tries, and 
Incorrect Password Tries. The rule base contains (34) which are 81 entries and the 
output of this rule base is one of the Importance Level attribute fuzzy sets (High, 
Medium, Low) for layer 2. 
Table 5.4: Sample of data classified for Layer 2 
Transaction 
Notes Profile ID Account Tries 
Incorrect 
Password Tries 
Details Layer 
Importance 
Level  
Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
 
Same implementation sample has been conducted, a sample of the structure and the 
records of the rule base for layer 3 are shown in Table 5.5. System main structure 
for layer 3 is the combination of Time on Service, Daily Transactions, and 
Transaction Time. The rule base contains (33) which are 27 entries and the output of 
this rule base is one of the Importance Level attribute fuzzy sets (High, Medium, 
Low) for layer 3. 
Table 5.5: Sample of data classified for Layer 3 
Time on 
Service 
Daily 
Transactions Transaction Time 
Environment Layer 
Importance Level Rate 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
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The aggregated surface of the rule evaluation is defuzzified using the Mamdani 
method to find the Centre of Gravity (COG). Centroid defuzzification technique 
shown in Equation (1) can be expressed as: 
 
 dxx dxxxCOG ii )( )(    Equation (1) 
µi(x): Aggregated membership function.  
x: Output variable. 
 
Figure 5.7 illustrate the set of fuzzy rules extracted from layer 1 using MATLAB 
R2010a, rules are based on a set of IF-THEN statements describing the effect of 
each factor in layer 1 on overall layer importance level. Figure 5.3 shows the 
surface view for layer 1 as well. 
After deploying the fuzzy classification methodology on the three layers using 
MATLAB R2010a, we then have a list of classified tags with an importance level 
attribute defined and assigned.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Set of fuzzy rules for layer 1 
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Figure 5.8: Surface view for layer 1 
The fuzzy classification phase successfully processed the selected sample of 1,000 
messages, The account segment layer recorded 267 out of the 1,000 sample with a 
"High" importance level representing 26.7% positively qualified for high level of 
encryption of key size of 256k. 62 out of 1,000 messages classified with a 
―Medium‖ importance level, representing 6.2% qualified for an encryption of 128k 
key size. 
Finally 671 out of 1,000 classified with a ―Low‖ importance level representing 
67.1% of the total skipping the encryption process to be forwarded directly to 
message assembler.  
Details segment layer achieved 401 occurrences out of the same 1,000 sample 
messages with a ―High‖ importance level, representing 40.1% of the total positively 
qualified for high level encryption of key size of 256k. 410 out of 1,000 messages 
have been classified with a ―Medium‖ importance level, representing 41% qualified 
for an encryption of size 128k key. The remaining 189 out of the 1,000 sample 
marked with ―Low‖ importance level, representing 18.9% which require no 
encryption processing. 
Environment segment layer recorded 250 occurrences out of the same 1,000 sample 
messages with a ―High‖ importance level, representing 25% of the total positively 
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qualified for high level encryption of key size 256k. 421 occurrences recorded with 
a ―Medium‖ importance level to be encrypted with a 128k key size. The final 329 
occurrences marked with a ―Low‖ importance level to be forwarded without any 
further processing. 30.6% of the occurrences average across the three layers 
achieved ―High‖ importance level, 29.7% achieved ―Medium‖ importance level, 
and 39.6% of the total marked ―Low‖ importance level across the three layers. 
 
Figure 5.9: Fuzzy classification chart for sample implementation 
 
The results clearly indicate as shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.10 that 26.8% of the 
sample 1,000 messages have a fuzzy classification level of "high" which require 
high encryption mechanism to secure the sensitive parts. 67% of the sample 
messages have been marked as "low" which have been forwarded directly without 
performing any encryption mechanism. The remaining 6.2% will adopt a high level 
of encryption but with lower key size. 
Table 5.6: Fuzzy Classification table for first sample implementation 
Fuzzy Classification 
Layer 
―High‖  
Appearances 
―Medium‖  
Appearance
s 
Percentage 
(High + 
Medium) 
Layer1 (Account) 267 62 32.9% 
Layer 2 (Details) 401 410 81.1% 
Layer 3 (Environment) 250 421 67.1% 
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As seen in table 5.6, the highest occurrences for ―High‖ and ―Medium‖ importance 
level combined is 32.9% in layer 1, which means only 32.9% of the 1,000 records 
sample data require an encryption processing either using 128bit key or 256bit key, 
leaving a 67.1% of the sample data to be forwarded directly to message assembler 
without the need of the encryption process. In brief, instead of performing full 
encryption for the whole XML message or even performing partial encryption on 
pre-selected parts, we were able to produce secured, optimized, and utilized 
messages, performing encryption only on needed parts selected using our fuzzy 
classification techniques based on the Mamdani method. 
 
5.8.2 Testing XML Encryption 
Assigned importance level is used as an indicator for which type of encryption is 
needed on corresponding node. Figure 5.10 illustrates a real XML message after 
fuzzy classification phase. 
 
Figure 5.10: Sample XML message after fuzzy classification phase 
As seen in the figure, the classified XML message has the ―Importance Level‖ 
attribute with value depending on the fuzzy classification phase, ―Importance 
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Level‖ attributes with a ―Medium‖ value is entitled to have an AES Encryption 
using 128-bit key, ―Importance Level‖ attributes with a ―High‖ value is entitled to 
have an AES Encryption using 256-bit key, Tags with no ―Importance Level‖ 
assigned will be forwarded to message assembler without performing any type of 
encryption. Figure 5.11 presents the XML message after deploying AES encryption 
on selected parts.  
 
Figure 5.11: Sample XML message after encryption phase 
 
As seen in Figure 5.11 only selected parts that are classified earlier are being 
encrypted whereby two different keys are deployed, first is AES 128-bit key on tags 
marked with ―Medium‖ ―Importance Level‖, second is AES 256-bit key on tags 
marked with ―High‖ ―Importance Level‖. Tags marked with ―Low‖ or not marked 
with any value will be forwarded to message assembler without performing any 
type of encryption. 
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5.9 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, extensive tests were carried out to check the performance of our model. 
The model was tested against W3C XML Encryption standard. Testing took place 
taking into consideration element-wise encryption and full encryption. Element-wise 
encryption was performed and evaluated based on two cases, the first by encrypting a 
pre-defined list of tags within each XML message and measuring the results against our 
model which uses element-wise encryption on a classified list of tags, tags were 
selected based on a previous step which classify the XML messages deploying fuzzy 
classification techniques. The second case is by encrypting the whole messages and 
comparing the results against our element-wise based encryption model. Results 
showed a significant improvement in both cases presenting the superiority of our basic 
concept which uses on-the-fly fuzzy classification mechanism for the final goal which is 
encrypting necessary parts. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Performance Evaluation - Implementation to Secure 
Financial XML Messages using Intelligent Fuzzy-
Based Techniques  
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presents the performance evaluation, evaluation methods, and actual testing 
that have been performed on real data sets to properly evaluate our secure XML 
management model. We also present the main application classes that have been used to 
classify outgoing XML documents, encrypt classified XML documents, and forwarders 
that used to aggregate message parts.  Main application code which was built using Java 
J2EE also presented, describes module functionality and interface. XML sample set 
extracted from our collected financial messages which have been used in our testing and 
evaluation stages. Finally, we summarize and conclude the chapter. 
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6.2 SXMS Performance Evaluation 
For our implementation of the secure XML management system and for performance 
measurement, we have developed our own desktop application built based on Java 
technology. Our application is used to perform both fuzzy classification and encryption 
of XML messages. We used Java programming language (J2SE1.6) to build the main 
application and user interface. Application is independent and can be used on different 
operating systems. 
 
6.2.1 Evaluation Method 
Two parameters have been taken into account in the evaluation process: the processing 
time that is used to encrypt the classified messages and the size of each message after 
encryption process. The results are compared against the W3C Encryption standard. 
 Processing Time: measure the time needed to fetch essential parts within each 
XML message and then encrypt needed tags using different key sizes, the 
measurement is based on the time needed from the starting point which is start 
of the XML message until the closing tag. Encryption process is performed on 
the whole message, selected tags, or no tags. All depending on the fuzzification 
stage prior to message encryption phase. 
 Processing File Size: measure the file size for each XML message, size is 
calculated after the encryption process take place. Resulting file size from our 
model will be compared against the file size from the W3C Encryption standard. 
 
6.2.2 Evaluation Preparations 
Prior to the encryption phase which will be comparing SXMS model with W3C XML 
Encryption recommendation, we deployed the fuzzification stage whereby we classified 
XML message sets that are going to be used in the evaluation stages. Fuzzification 
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process took place to assign an importance level value to the 10 characteristics extracted 
from the financial XML messages. Fuzzification stage performed by deploying set of 
"IF-THEN" conditions, these conditions reflect the relations between the different 
financial features and characteristics, and also it reflects the association with each other. 
Relation and association with each other are used for the final importance level value. 
Figure 6.1 shows a sample group of IF-THEN rules used in fuzzification process that is 
used to assign an importance level attribute a value between (High, Medium, and Low). 
 
Figure 6.1: Fuzzification stage (IF-THEN operators)  
 
6.2.3 Evaluation Stages 
We have performed our evaluation using two sets of XML messages; each set represent 
a period in which the messages were extracted. Each set has number of XML messages 
to test. Collected XML messages present online banking service transactions fetched 
from Jordan Ahli Bank, one of the leading banks in Jordan.  
We have selected to deploy full and partial encryption on selected sets of XML 
messages, whereby we will deploy full encryption on first set of XML messages, and 
partial encryption on the second set of XML message.  The two sets have been selected 
randomly taken for a period of seven months (between January 2012 until August 2012) 
representing financial transactions in specific. In the first set we collected 1,000 random 
XML messages presenting a period of three months taken between January 2012 and 
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March 2012. In the second set we used 1,500 XML messages presenting a period of 
four months taken between April 2012 and August 2012. Sample sets have been 
collected after taking necessary approvals and authorizations from the bank‘s concerned 
departments. Table 6.1 illustrates the two sets of XML messages in details. 
Table 6.1: Stage 1 Sets detail 
Set Number of XML messages 
Total Root 
Nodes 
Total 
Messages Size Period 
Encryption 
Performed 
1 1,000 messages 4,000 node 947 KB 3 Months Jan 12-Mar12 
Full 
Encryption 
2 1,500 messages 6,000 node 1380 KB 4 Months Apr12-Aug12 
Partial 
Encryption 
 
As seen in table 6.1, the first set has 1,000 XML messages with 4,000 root nodes 
and total size of 947KB. The second set has 1,500 XML messages with 6,000 root 
nodes and total size of 1380KB.  
To ensure we are evaluating our model in a fair and comprehensive manner, we 
divided our evaluation into two stages. Evaluation stages are compared against 
W3C XML Encryption Recommendations. In each stage there are two experiments 
performed, each experiment presents an encryption using different key sizes. In first 
stage we have deployed full message encryption using W3C encryption standard 
with different key sizes. In the second stage we have deployed partial encryption 
using W3C encryption standard with different key sizes.  Results from both stages 
are compared against our model which uses element-wise encryption and mixture of 
key sizes. Table 6.2 illustrates stage 1 evaluation details. 
Table 6.2: Performance evaluation for stage 1 
Stage Number of XML Messages Model 
Experiment 1 
Used Key Size 
Experiment 2 
Used Key Size 
1 1,000 Messages (4,000 Nodes) 
W3C 
(Full Encryption) 128 bit 256 bit 
SXMS 
(Element-Wise) 
 (128 bit or 256 bit or 
NO Encryption) 
 (128 bit or 256 bit 
or NO Encryption) 
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Stage 1: Evaluation for this stage has been conducted by performing two 
experiments; first experiment deployed performing full encryption using W3C 
XML encryption standard with a 128-bit key size deployed on the first set of 1,000 
sample XML messages. SXMS uses the same sample of XML messages to deploy 
element-wise encryption. SXMS model uses symmetric AES encryption with mixed 
key values (128-bit, 256-bit), Key size used in the encryption process depends on 
the importance level attribute value assigned by the fuzzification stage for selected 
set of tags within each XML message. Second experiment has been conducted 
performing full encryption using W3C XML encryption standard with a 256-bit key 
deployed on the same 1,000 sample XML messages. SXMS uses the same sample 
of XML messages to deploy element-wise encryption. Later we compared results 
for both experiments against results from our model. 
Table 6.3 illustrates time needed and resulting file size to encrypt the XML message 
set using our model compared against W3C XML encryption model using a key 
size of 128 bit encrypting each message in full. 
 
Table 6.3: Processing time and resulting file sizes using SXMS and W3C-128  
Stage 1 – Experiment 1 
(Full Encryption) Processing Time File Size 
XML Message Set SXMS Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 ms 0.0023 ms 1.14 KB 1.87 KB 
300 XML Chunk 0.562 ms 0.702 ms 167.9 KB 263 KB 
600 XML Chunk 0.873 ms 1.264 sec 342.6 KB 541.9 KB 
900 XML Chunk 1.271 sec 1.825 sec 501.9 KB 799.7 KB 
1,000 XML (Set 1) 1.625 sec 2.456 sec 652.4 KB 988 KB 
 
We have encrypted the XML messages in chunks of 1, 300, 600, 900, and 1,000 
messages. Our SXMS model processed the XML chunks with a significant 
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improvement in processing time compared to W3C XML encryption model which 
uses a 128-bit key size to encrypt the whole XML message.  
SXMS uses a 128-bit key in the cases where the importance level attribute value 
equals to ―Medium‖ and 256-bit key used when the importance level attribute value 
equals to ―High‖. As seen in table 6.3, the encryption process for the whole XML 
1,000 messages using W3C Encryption standard with a 128-bit key size took 2.456 
seconds to complete, compared to 1.625 seconds using SXMS model. The result 
reflects a 33.8% improvement in processing time for the 1,000 messages. Figure 6.2 
illustrates the comparison between the two models and performance improvement 
using SXMS. Table 6.3 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML 
messages using SXMS model, table shows a significant reduction in file size, 
whereby the total size of the encrypted 1,000 XML messages was 988 KB using 
W3C model with a key size of 128-bit encrypting each XML message in full. 
SXMS achieved smaller sizes for the same set of 1,000 encrypted XML messages 
which is 652.4 KB showing a size reduction of 34% from the encrypted file size 
using W3C model. Such improvement can save a significant amount of space and 
bandwidth on large scale. Figure 6.2 illustrates the processing time needed to 
encrypt the sample messages in the first experiment compared to our model. 
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison chart between SXMS and W3C model using 128-bit key 
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As seen in Figure 6.2, the x-axis present the number of XML messages being processed, 
while y-axis present the processing time encrypting XML messages in seconds.  
 
Figure 6.3 presents file size comparison for the encrypted XML messages using SXMS 
and W3C XML Encryption syntax and processing model using a key size of 128-bit 
performing full message encryption. 
 
Figure 6.3: File size comparison between SXMS and W3C model using 128-bit  
 
In the second experiment of stage 1, we deployed W3C Encryption standard to fully 
encrypt the same sample of 1,000 XML messages but this time using 256-bit key size. 
SXMS uses the same sample of XML messages to deploy element-wise encryption. 
SXMS model uses symmetric AES encryption with mixed key values (128-bit, 256-bit), 
Key size used in the encryption process depends on the importance level attribute value 
assigned by the fuzzification stage for selected set of tags within each XML message.  
 
Table 6.4 represents the time needed for each model performing the encryption process 
on selected sample of messages. 
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Table 6.4: Processing time table using SXMS and W3C-256 Model (Full 
Encryption) 
Stage 1 – Experiment 2 
(Full Encryption) Processing Time File Size 
XML Message Set SXMS Model 
W3C 
256 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
256 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 ms 0.0027 ms 1.14 KB 1.98 KB 
300 XML Chunk 0.562 ms 0.811 ms 167.9 KB 283.4 KB 
600 XML Chunk 0.873 ms 1.591 sec 342.6 KB 601 KB 
900 XML Chunk 1.271 sec 2.137 sec 501.9 KB 864.8 KB 
1,000 XML (Set 1) 1.625 sec 2.8 sec 652.4 KB 1112 KB 
 
As seen in Table 6.4, the encryption process for the whole message using the W3C 
Encryption standard with a 256-bit key size took 2.8 seconds to complete, compared to 
1.625 seconds using SXMS model. The result reflects a 41.9% improvement in 
processing time for the 1,000 messages. 
 
Table 6.4 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML messages using SXMS 
model, table shows a significant reduction in file size, whereby the total size of the 
encrypted 1,000 XML messages was 1112 KB using W3C model with a key size of 
256-bit encrypting each XML message in full. SXMS achieved smaller sizes for the 
same set of 1,000 encrypted XML messages which is 652.4 KB showing a size 
reduction of 41.3% from the encrypted file size using W3C model. Such improvement 
can save a significant amount of space and bandwidth on large scale. Figure 6.4 
illustrates the performance comparison between SXMS model and W3C encryption 
standard using key size of 256-bit. Figure 6.5 presents file size comparison for the 
encrypted XML messages using SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and 
processing model using a key size of 256-bit performing full message encryption. 
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Figure 6.4: Performance comparison between SXMS and XML using 256-bit  
 
 
Figure 6.5: File Size comparison between SXMS and XML using 256-bit key 
 
Finally, figures 6.6, 6.7 illustrates the final performance and file size reduction 
comparison between SXMS and W3C model for both experiments which uses 128-
bit key and 256-bit key performing full encrypting for each XML message in the 
first message set. Figure presents a significant amount of performance improvement 
using SXMS model.  
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Figure 6.6: Final performance comparison between SXMS and W3C models 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Final file size comparison between SXMS and W3C models 
 
Table 6.5: Performance evaluation for stage 2 
Stage 
Number of 
XML 
Messages 
Model Experiment 1 Used Key Size 
Experiment 2 
Used Key Size 
2 
1,500 
Messages 
(6,000 Nodes) 
W3C 
(Partial 
Encryption) 
128 bit 256 bit 
SXMS 
(Element-Wise) 
 (128 bit or 256 
bit or NO 
Encryption) 
 (128 bit or 256 
bit or NO 
Encryption) 
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Stage 2: Evaluation for this stage has been conducted by performing two 
experiments; first experiment deployed performing partial encryption on a pre-
defined list of tags using W3C XML encryption standard with a 128-bit key size 
deployed on the second set of 1,500 sample XML messages. SXMS uses the same 
sample of XML messages to deploy element-wise encryption. SXMS model uses 
symmetric AES encryption with mixed key values (128-bit, 256-bit), Key size used 
in the encryption process depends on the importance level attribute value assigned 
by the fuzzification stage for selected set of tags within each XML message. Second 
experiment has been conducted performing partial encryption on a pre-defined list 
of tags using W3C XML encryption standard with a 256-bit key deployed on the 
same 1,500 sample XML messages. SXMS uses the same sample of XML messages 
to deploy element-wise encryption. Later we compared results for both experiments 
against results from our model. 
Table 6.6 presents time needed to encrypt the sample messages using our model 
compared against W3C XML encryption model using a key size of 128 bit to 
encrypt part of the message for the whole set. 
 
Table 6.6: Processing time table using SXMS and W3C-128 Model (Partial 
Encryption) 
Stage 2 – Experiment 1 
(Partial Encryption) Processing Time File Size 
XML Message Set SXMS Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
128 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 ms 0.0019 ms 1.14 KB 1.61 KB 
300 XML Chunk 0.562 ms 0.578 ms 167.9 KB 244 KB 
600 XML Chunk 0.873 ms 0.984 sec 342.6 KB 510.2 KB 
900 XML Chunk 1.271 sec 1.422 sec 501.9 KB 740.7 KB 
1,500 XML (Set 2) 1.963 sec 2.218 sec 810.1 KB 1203.6 KB 
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As seen in Table 6.6, the encryption process for part of the message using the W3C 
Encryption standard with a 128-bit key size took 2.218 seconds to complete, 
compared to 1.963 seconds using SXMS model. The result reflects an 11.4% 
improvement in processing time for the 1,500 messages.  
Table 6.6 also illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML messages using 
SXMS model, table shows a significant reduction in file size, whereby the total size 
of the encrypted 1,500 XML messages was 1203.6 KB using W3C model with a 
key size of 128-bit encrypting each XML message partially. SXMS achieved 
smaller sizes for the same set of 1,500 encrypted XML messages which is 810.1 KB 
showing a size reduction of 32.6% from the encrypted file size using W3C model. 
Such improvement can save a significant amount of space and bandwidth on large 
scale.  Figure 6.8 illustrates the comparison between SXMS model and W3C 
encryption standard using key size of 128-bit. 
 
Figure 6.8: Performance comparison between SXMS and W3C Standard using 
AES-128 Key  
Figure 6.9 presents file size comparison for the encrypted XML messages using 
SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and processing model using a key size 
of 128-bit performing partial message encryption. 
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Figure 6.9: File size comparison between SXMS and W3C Standard using AES-
128 Key  
In the second experiment of stage 2, we deployed W3C Encryption standard to 
partially encrypt the XML messages to same sample of 1,500 XML messages 
but this time using 256-bit key size. SXMS uses the same sample of XML 
messages to deploy element-wise encryption. SXMS model uses symmetric AES 
encryption with mixed key values (128-bit, 256-bit), Key size used in the 
encryption process depends on the importance level attribute value assigned by 
the fuzzification stage for selected set of tags within each XML message. Table 
6.4 represents the time needed for each model performing the encryption process 
on selected sample of messages. 
 
Table 6.7: Processing time table using SXMS and W3C-256 Model (Partial) 
Stage 2 – Experiment 2 
(Partial Encryption) Processing Time File Size 
XML Message Set SXMS Model 
W3C 
256 bit 
SXMS 
Model 
W3C 
256 bit 
1 XML File 0.0018 ms 0.0021 ms 1.14 KB 1.72 KB 
300 XML Chunk 0.562 ms 0.687 ms 167.9 KB 269 KB 
600 XML Chunk 0.873 sec 1.42 sec 342.6 KB 588.4 KB 
900 XML Chunk 1.271 sec 2.026 sec 501.9 KB 813.9 KB 
1,500 XML (Set 2) 1.963 sec 2.899 sec 810.1 KB 1399.6 KB 
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As seen in Table 6.7, the encryption process for part of the message using the 
W3C Encryption standard with a 256-bit key size took 2.899 seconds to 
complete, compared to 1.963 seconds using SXMS model. The result reflects a 
32.2% improvement in processing time for the 1,500 messages. Table 6.7 also 
illustrates files size reduction encrypting XML messages using SXMS model, 
table shows a significant reduction in file size, whereby the total size of the 
encrypted 1,500 XML messages was 1399.6 KB using W3C model with a key 
size of 256-bit encrypting parts of the XML message. SXMS achieved smaller 
sizes for the same set of 1,500 encrypted XML messages which is 810.1 KB 
showing a size reduction of 42.1% from the encrypted file size using W3C 
model. Such improvement can save a significant amount of space and bandwidth 
on large scale. Figure 6.10 illustrates the comparison between SXMS model and 
W3C encryption standard using key size of 256-bit encrypting parts of the XML 
message for the second sample set. 
 
Figure 6.10: comparison between SXMS and W3C Standard using AES-256 
Key  
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Figure 6.11 presents file size comparison for the encrypted XML messages using 
SXMS and W3C XML Encryption syntax and processing model using a key size 
of 256-bit performing partial message encryption. 
 
Figure 6.11: File size comparison between SXMS and W3C model using 256-bit 
key 
Finally, figures 6.12, 6.13 illustrate performance improvements and file size 
reduction comparison between SXMS model and W3C model for both 
experiments in stage 2 showing a significant amount of performance 
improvement and size reduction on a large scale using SXMS model.  
 
Figure 6.12: comparison between SXMS and W3C Standard using different keys 
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Figure 6.13: file size comparison between SXMS and W3C Standard using 
different keys 
 
We have presented evidence that implementing element-wise encryption based 
on the fuzzy classification techniques to encrypt only necessary parts within 
XML messages can improve performance of the encryption process, and can 
reduce encrypted file sizes which eventually will save space and bandwidth on a 
large scale.  
 
6.3 Screenshots, Source Codes, and Pseudo Code Examples 
6.3.1 Screenshot Examples 
Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15 demonstrates screenshots of our application that is used in 
our testing and evaluation. Our intelligent model checked all extracted 10 characteristics 
within each XML message. Then using the fuzzification approach adopted by our main 
application, for the final importance level assigned for each tag, we have associated and 
classified all patterns with each other. Then we used our element-wise encryption 
embedded within the application to perform encryption using mixed keys depending on 
importance level value assigned by the fuzzification stage. The usage of AES 
encryption with a specific key value depends on the importance level assigned. 
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Whereby, tags assigned the value ―High‖ will be encrypted and their descendants using 
AES encryption with a key value of 256-bit, tags assigned with ―Medium‖ will be 
encrypted using a key value of 128-bit. Finally tags with ―Low‖ importance level will 
be forwarded to message assembly without any encryption performed. 
 
Figure 6.14: SXMS Main application interface 
 
Figure 6.15: Main application result files after encryption process 
 
 148 
6.3.2 Source Codes Examples 
In this section we represent some source code examples used in our application.   Main application source code (Java): 
  
     new Thread(new Runnable(){ 
            public void run(){ 
                File dir = new File(settings.srcDir); 
                File[] xmls = dir.listFiles(); 
                progress.setMaximum(xmls.length); 
                progress.setValue(0); 
                ArrayList<Object[]> times = new ArrayList<Object[]>();  //It will store xml 
name and time take for encryption or decryption. 
 
                for(File xmlName : xmls){ 
                    Date timeStampStart = new Date();                   //Starting time of 
encryption/decryption. 
                    progress.setValue(progress.getValue()+1); 
                    String fileName = xmlName.getPath(); 
                    String xml = ""; 
                    try { 
                        xml = getXmlString(new File(fileName));         //Getting xml string from 
a xml file. 
                    } catch (Exception ex) { 
                        javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Error while 
opening input xml file!!"); 
                        return; 
                    } 
                    String tagName = settings.tagName; 
                    String attName = settings.priorityAttribute; 
 
                    ArrayList<Data> datas = Data.parseXml(xml, tagName, attName);   
//Getting list of data which need to be encrytped or decrypted. 
                    for(Data data : datas){ 
                        //Checking for key code. 
                        int keycode = 128; 
                        if(data.priority.equals(settings.aes256)) keycode = 256; 
                        else if(data.priority.equals(settings.aes128))keycode = 128; 
                        else { 
                            //If key code does not match it will simply ignore it. 
                            //javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(this, "Key code 
does not match. Skipping "+data.startIndex+" To "+data.endIndex); 
                            data.data2=data.data; 
                            continue; 
                        } 
 
                        if(radioEncrypt.isSelected()){ 
                            byte[] cipherBytes=null; 
                            try { 
                                cipherBytes = AES.encrypt(data.data, settings.password, 
keycode);       //Getting Encrypted data. 
                            } catch (Exception ex) { 
                                javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Error at the 
time of encryption"+ex.toString()); 
                                continue; 
                            } 
                            data.data2= "\r\n<EncryptedData 
Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element' 
xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'> \r\n" + 
                                        "<CipherData>\r\n<CipherValue>" + new 
sun.misc.BASE64Encoder().encode(cipherBytes) + 
                                        "</CipherValue>\r\n</CipherData>\r\n</EncryptedData>\r\n"; 
                        }else{ 
                            try { 
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                                //Getting decrypted data. 
                                byte[] decoded =AES.decrypt(new 
sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(data.getCipherData()), settings.password, 
keycode); 
                                data.data2 = new String(decoded); 
                            } catch (Exception ex) { 
                                javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Error at the 
time of decryption"+ex.toString()); 
                                return; 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
 
                    int startIndex = 0; 
                    String newXml = ""; 
                    //Recreating the xml after encryption or decryption. 
                    for(Data data : datas){ 
                        newXml += xml.substring(startIndex, data.startIndex); 
                        newXml += data.data2; 
                        startIndex=data.endIndex; 
                    } 
                    newXml += xml.substring(startIndex); 
                    //Saving the new file to the destination folder. 
                    try { 
                        String dstFile = settings.dstDir+"\\"+xmlName.getName(); 
                        PrintWriter pw = new PrintWriter(dstFile); 
                        pw.print(newXml); 
                        pw.flush(); 
                        pw.close(); 
                    } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) { 
                        javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Error when writing 
final xml!!\n"+ex.toString()); 
                    } 
 
                    //Storing the orginal file into archive folder. 
                    String archName = settings.arcDir+"\\"+ xmlName.getName(); 
                    while(!xmlName.renameTo(new File(archName))){ 
                        archName=archName.substring(0, archName.length()-4)+"_"+".xml"; 
                    } 
                    //Processing ending time. 
                    Date timeStampEnd = new Date(); 
                    long timeTook = timeStampEnd.getTime()-timeStampStart.getTime(); 
//Calculating time took for the process. 
                    times.add(new Object[]{xmlName.getName(),timeTook}); 
 
                } 
                javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Done"); 
 
                //Showing time took for each file and total time. 
                if(times.size()>0){ 
                    int n = JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(null, "Do you like to save time 
stat?","AESEncrypt",JOptionPane.YES_NO_OPTION); 
                    if(n==JOptionPane.YES_OPTION){ 
                        final JFileChooser fc = new JFileChooser(); 
                        int returnVal = fc.showSaveDialog(null); 
                        if (returnVal == JFileChooser.APPROVE_OPTION) { 
                            File file = fc.getSelectedFile(); 
                            try { 
                                PrintWriter pw = new PrintWriter(file.getPath()); 
                                pw.println("FILE NAME\t\t\t\tTIME TOOK\r\n---------\t\t\t\t---------
\r\n"); 
                                long total=0; 
                                for(Object[] obj: times){ 
                                    String fileName = (String)obj[0]; 
                                    long time = (Long)obj[1]; 
                                    total += time; 
                                    pw.println(fileName+"\t\t\t\t"+time); 
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                                } 
                                pw.println("---------\t\t\t\t---------\r\nTotal Time\t\t\t\t"+total+" or 
"+(total/1000)+"."+(total%1000)+" Sec"); 
                                pw.flush(); 
                                pw.close(); 
                                javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,"Done"); 
                            } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {} 
                        } 
                    } 
                } 
                 
                btnContinue.setEnabled(true); 
                radioEncrypt.setEnabled(true); 
                radioDecrypt.setEnabled(true); 
            } 
        }).start(); 
        } 
      
In the above code, we started by initializing the components that will be used in our 
process, at first we initialize the counter to check-up the processing speed needed 
for the whole process. Then reading XML files form incoming XML documents by 
getXMLString() function. Then we execute the parsing step to know which parts to 
be encrypted by calling Data.parseXml() function, later we define which key value 
to be used upon reading key string value. After deploying the encryption process for 
selected parts, we read the encrypted values by executing AES.encrypt(data.data, 
settings.password, keycode); function. Final stage is by assembling the message 
(with encrypted parts and forwarded parts) which requires file re-creation.  
Encryption time is calculated by initiating the variable timeStampStart of Date() 
type and running cross the application to start the counter, later another variable 
initiated at end of the encryption process called timeStampEnd which reads the time 
at the finishing stage.  
                                             Parse XML Code:  
 
public String getXmlString(File xml) throws Exception{ 
        String fileContent = ""; 
        try { 
            BufferedReader reader = new java.io.BufferedReader(new 
java.io.FileReader(xml.getPath())); 
            String row = reader.readLine(); 
            while(row!=null){ 
                fileContent+=row+"\r\n"; 
                row = reader.readLine(); 
            } 
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            reader.close(); 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            throw ex; 
        } 
        return fileContent; 
    } 
 
In the above class, we parse XML messages by using XPath function. 
getXMLString() is used to read the file by getting full file path and then read it line 
by line. Function returns file content to be used later in the encryption process.  
  Read Encrypted XML Data 
 
public String getCipherData(){ 
        String retVal=""; 
        Pattern p = 
Pattern.compile("<([\\s]*)CipherValue([^>]*)>([\\w\\W]*?)<([\\s]*)/([\\s]*)CipherValue([\\s
]*)>"); 
        Matcher m = p.matcher(data); 
        while(m.find()){ 
            retVal = m.group(); 
            int s = retVal.indexOf(">")+1; 
            int e = retVal.lastIndexOf("<"); 
            retVal=retVal.substring(s, e).trim(); 
        } 
 
        return retVal; 
    } 
} 
 
In the above class, we read encrypted data by using GetCipherData() function 
which gets the base64-encoded data representing the encrypted form of the plaintext 
data.  
  AES Encryption Class (Encryption): 
 
public class AES { 
 
    /** 
     * Encrypt a string using AES Encryption. 
     * 
     * @param  data  String data to be encrypted. 
     * @param  pass  Password for symmetric encryption. 
     * @param  encryptSize  128 or 256 . 
     */ 
    public static byte[] encrypt(String data, String pass, int encryptSize) throws 
Exception{ 
        try{ 
                byte[] keyBytes = getPassBytes(pass, encryptSize); 
                byte[] input = data.getBytes(); 
                SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES"); 
                Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES"); 
                cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key); 
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                byte[] cipherText = cipher.doFinal(input); 
 
                return cipherText; 
            }catch (Exception ex) { 
                throw ex; 
            } 
    } 
 
In the AES encryption class, the cipher object is initialized. The initialization is 
done in cipher.init (Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key); method. The first parameter 
determines the operation mode of the cipher. As we want to encrypt a file, we use 
the ENCRYPT_MODE. The second parameter is the secret key which should be 
used for encryption. 
  AES Decryption Class: 
public static byte[] decrypt(byte[] data, String pass, int encryptSize) throws Exception{ 
        try{ 
                byte[] keyBytes = getPassBytes(pass, encryptSize); 
                byte[] input = data;//data.getBytes(); 
                SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES"); 
                Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES"); 
                cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key); 
                byte[] cipherText = cipher.doFinal(input); 
 
                return cipherText; 
            }catch (Exception ex) { 
                throw ex; 
            } 
    } 
 
In the AES decryption class, we start the decryption process based on the incoming 
message. Function calls the data string, encryption size and assign read ciphered data to 
a variable. Then we use the same cipher as for encryption, but we initialize it for 
decryption with the previously generated secret key. 
 
6.3.3 Pseudo Codes Examples 
Below are some important pseudo examples for extracting importance level value for 
the fuzzy classification phase in our system implementation. 
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 Read XML Tag “Importance Level”:  
 
Value XML_Tag_Value = “Importance Level” 
Number_Of_Tags; 
Get Parsed_XML_Message;  
Get XML_Tag_Value; 
 
While count <= Number_Of_Tags  
Check XML_Tag_Value 
       If XML_Tag_Value = “High” 
        Encryption_Algorithm = “AES” 
      Encryption_Key = “256” 
Do_Encryption_Function1 for the XML Tag: XML_Tag_Value AND Childs 
       If XML_Tag_Value = “Medium” 
        Encryption_Algorithm = “AES” 
      Encryption_Key = “128” 
Do_Encryption_Function2 for the XML Tag: XML_Tag_Value AND Childs 
       If XML_Tag_Value = “Low” OR XML_Tag_Value = “” 
        Encryption_Algorithm = “” 
      Encryption_Key = “” 
Do_Message_Forward_Function for the XML Tag: XML_Tag_Value AND Childs 
 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, extensive tests were carried out to check the performance of SXMS 
model and file size reduction. The basic idea of testing is to measure the encryption 
processing time and resulting file sizes. SXMS model was tested against W3C XML 
Encryption standard. Testing took place taking into consideration element-wise 
encryption and full encryption. Element-wise encryption was performed and evaluated 
based on two cases, the first by encrypting a pre-defined list of tags within each XML 
message and measuring the results against SXMS model which uses element-wise 
encryption on a fuzzified list of tags, tags were selected based on a previous step which 
classify XML messages deploying fuzzification techniques. The second case performed 
by encrypting the whole messages and comparing the results against our element-wise 
based encryption model. Results showed a significant improvement in both cases 
presenting the superiority of our basic concept which uses on-the-fly fuzzy 
classification mechanism encrypting only critical information within XML messages.  
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The other achievement is the encrypted file size reduction, whereby deploying SXMS 
produced smaller file sizes post the encryption process which saves both time and 
bandwidth on a large scale. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we have characterized an intelligent and secure XML management system 
has been proposed for securing financial XML messages. System has been designed to 
secure the essential parts within the financial XML messages. Fuzzy logic has been 
used to provide an efficient technique for creating an intelligent model to fetch the 
important parts within each XML message, which involves selecting the important parts 
and assigning them an attribute value called the importance level. An element-wise 
encryption model is used to encrypt selected parts from the fuzzy classification phase; 
encryption uses different key sizes during the encryption process depending on the 
importance level value. Set of experiments have been deployed to analyse different 
transaction features and patterns, with all corresponding relations. Experiments result 
presented the need for deploying a secure yet efficient system to handle exchanged 
messages in business applications in general and in financial applications in particular. 
The importance is not only in securing the transactions but in securing them in an 
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efficient and robust way. The SXMS model covered the concept of providing an 
efficient yet robust security mechanism for exchanging XML messages.  
 
Phase one of SXMS uses a fuzzy-logic-based model to detect the important parts within 
XML messages. The fuzzy logic model we have proposed consisted of the main four 
stages (fuzzification stage, rule evaluation stage, aggregation stage, and finally 
defuzzification stage). Financial XML message features are characterized as fuzzy 
variables with specific fuzzy sets. For the purpose of final calculation of the XML 
importance level attribute value, the fuzzy rules are processed by the operations 
performed by fuzzy set into the inference engine.  
 
We showed in our experiments that securing only the needed parts within each XML 
message is an effective mechanism to use on a large scale. In our results, we were able 
to achieve a significant improvement in encryption processing speed. In our first 
experiment, we achieved a 33.8% improvement in processing time for our sample 
messages. Using same sample messages, we were able to reduce file sizes for encrypted 
XML messages. A significant size reduction of 34% achieved using our model 
compared to encrypted XML messages using W3C Encryption.  
In our second experiment on the same data sample, we were able to achieve 
improvement in encryption processing time whereby we reached 41.9% improvement 
using different key size. File size reduction is achieved as well hitting 41.3% 
improvement in our second experiment using same data sample.  
We have conducted an additional two experiments using a different data sample consist 
of 1,500 messages. Using the same key size our model achieved 11.4% improvement in 
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Using same sample set of data but with different key size, we were able to achieve 
another improvement in encryption processing time marking 32.2% faster to encrypt the 
same sample and a 42.1% file size reduction for resulted encrypted files. 
 
A desktop application has been developed and implemented. This application has 
extracted all the XML message features. Verification of the extracted features has been 
plugged into the model to identify importance level values effectively. An element-wise 
encryption module has been integrated into the solution to perform element-wise 
encryption effectively on the selected parts. The importance level attributes within each 
XML message that have values of ―High‖ or ―Medium‖ are then processed. Different 
key sizes are used depending on the importance level value.  
 
The results from our evaluation stages and testing stages illustrated that our proposed 
solution outperformed the existing XML security solutions. Our solution outperformed 
these existing models in terms of efficiency, accuracy, and the speed of importance 
level detection, using fuzzy classification techniques.   
We have presented a comparative performance of proposed system in order to illustrate 
the capabilities through testing stages. 
Potential contributions can be deduced from our research that could enhance overall 
model deployment in different niches and fields. The following are the main 
contributions and achievements described in detail: 
1. Significant improvement in processing time performing either element-wise 
encryption or full encryption, an average improvement in encryption processing 
time of 22.6% achieved compared to W3C Encryption model using the same key 
size. An average 34.5% improvement also achieved using different key size. 
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2. Significant file size reduction achieved, an average file deduction of 33.3% 
achieved compared to W3C Encryption model using the same key size, and a 41.2% 
size reduction achieved using different key size.  
3. The ten features and patterns that characterize financial XML messages were 
extracted in a successful way and distributed in three main layers, depending on the 
transaction attribute nature. 
4. A resilient, secure, and intelligent XML model has been proposed. The mechanism 
uses fuzzy logic to process the features of XML messages. The model performs 
element-wise encryption on selected parts with attribute values set to ―High‖ or 
―Medium‖.  
5. A desktop application has been designed and developed to test and validate our 
proposed model. The testing was done to prove the reliability, feasibility, and 
extraction process of the mechanism. The application has been developed using Java 
programming language; our application successfully extracted the critical and 
important parts within two chunks of sample messages. The two samples reflected 
1,000 and 1,500 XML messages. 
6. The SXMS model was built with flexibility taken into consideration. The system 
was designed to handle future enhancements and modifications, so researchers 
would be able to make core changes either at the fuzzy classification stage or at the 
encryption stage. Such core changes could include changing the fuzzy classification 
technique and how it is used; this could be used in conjunction with data mining and 
classification techniques, or could even be completely replaced with well-known 
classifiers like decision trees (Quinlan, 1979, 1986, 1998) or Classification based on 
association (CBA) (Liu, Hsu, & Ma, 1998). Core changes could also include 
changing the encryption algorithm and used keys: the AES encryption could be 
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replaced with DES or triple DES encryption, if the researchers could prove this 
change‘s feasibility. The flexibility of our model leaves a wide range of space for 
enhancements and new contributions.    
 
7.2 Future Work 
A secure XML management system has been introduced for handling the exchanging of 
XML messages in a secure and efficient way. Our proposed solution is based on two 
main phases: the first phase involves fetching the important parts within XML messages 
by implementing a fuzzy based classification technique. This technique uses an 
intelligent fuzzy methodology based on a layered structure to collect and analyse all of 
the XML message features and patterns. The second phase involves adopting an 
element-wise encryption mechanism that uses different key sizes to encrypt the parts 
selected in the previous stage. The level of encryption used on the selected parts 
depends on the attribute values assigned in the fuzzy classification stage: if the attribute 
value for an importance level tag is set to ―High‖, AES encryption with a key value of 
256 bits is used. A key value of 128 bits is used in the case of a ―Medium‖ attribute 
value. Finally, tags with no attribute values assigned or those set to ―Low‖ are 
forwarded without deploying any type of encryption.   
This kind of intelligent and supervised machine learning technique provides a large 
amount of room and potential for future improvements and enhancements.  
 
Each unit in our SXMS model acts independently as a separate system. This flexible 
nature allows and motivates future work and enhancements. Despite the significant 
improvement on the processing time and file size reduction, the proposed system has 
some limitations in term of automating the whole process, especially rule evaluation 
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stage whereby we need to inject the expert knowledge manually during fuzzification 
stage. The following points describe the future work that could be achieved to improve 
system functionality and automation of certain areas:  
 
Fuzzy classification phase: We can employ supervised machine learning for fuzzy rule 
generation process automation. By performing this automation we can reduce the 
human expert involvement with high potential to increase fuzzy classification phase 
performance. This could be achieved by generating classification rules using well-
known classifiers. For example, we could use PRISM (Cendrowska, 1987), C4.5 
Decision Tree (Quinlan, 1996), Ripper (Cohen, 1995), Classification based on 
association (CBA) (Liu et al., 1998), k-nearest neighbour classification (kNN) (Guo et 
al., 2006), support vector machines (SVM) (Brank et al., 2003), naïve bayes 
classification (McCallum & Nigam, 1998), neural networks (NN) (Ng et al., 1997), 
linear least squares fit mapping (Yang & Chute, 1993), or the vector space method 
(Gauch et al., 2004). These association classification rules could be shared with a fuzzy 
logic inference engine to provide importance level extraction in an efficient way. 
 
Encryption phase: We could utilize a different encryption scheme; asymmetric 
algorithms could be deployed. We have deployed symmetric encryption due to its 
efficiency and processing time; it outperforms asymmetric encryption algorithms. 
However, we could change the symmetric encryption algorithm to something different 
like DES, triple DES, or blowfish encryption. Researchers will be able to test and 
measure the performance for any replaced encryption algorithm. Also, usage of the 
encryption keys could be change to reflect different key sizes for each importance level 
assigned. For example, we could assign an encryption key size of 192 bits instead of 
256 bits for the importance level ―High‖ value. 
 161 
There is also the ability to add the concept of XML classification instead of fuzzy 
classification or associative classification. XML classification focuses on structure 
similarity rather than content. We could use the classification technique using 
hierarchical taxonomies proposed by (Fuhr & Weikum, 2002), or we could use the well-
known classifier called XRules proposed by (Zaki & Aggarwal, 2003), which focuses 
on the structural classification of XML documents. We also might consider a hybrid 
combination of content and structural classification as proposed by (Denoyer & 
Gallinari, 2004), which is based on a generative Bayesian classifier. 
 
Finally, regarding the ability to generalize the Fuzzy-based Model for Financial XML 
Transactions Security adoption,   we can expand our work in fuzzy classification phase 
to enable XML message parsing without the need to create a pre-defined structure. By 
performing this kind of improvement, we will be able to adopt the model with ease and 
without the need to create a pre-defined structure for message extraction. Successful 
adoption of this generalization enables commercial packaging for broader use in 
commercial and financial areas.  
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Appendix A 
 
Rules for Layer 1, Layer 2, and Layer 3 
 
The complete list of rules extracted from MATLAB is listed in Appendix A. rules 
represent the three layers, layer 1 which is the account segment, layer 2 which is the 
details segment, and layer 3 which is environment segment. There are 135 rule 
defined in this list. 
 
Rules for Layer 1 (Account Segment) 
 
There are 27 rules extracted from MATLAB fuzzy set, layer 1 represent account 
segment.  
 
Fuzzy Rules: 
 
Rule 1. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Non-
Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) (0.4) 
Rule 2. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Normal) 
then (output1 is Low) (0.4)        
Rule 3. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) 
then (output1 is Medium) (0.4)  
Rule 4. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) 
then (output1 is Low) (0.4)        
Rule 5. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Normal) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)            
Rule 6. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)         
Rule 7. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) 
then (output1 is Low) (0.4)     
Rule 8. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Normal) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)         
Rule 9. If (Amount is Non-Sensitive) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)      
Rule 10. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) 
then (output1 is Medium) (0.4)    
Rule 11. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Normal) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)           
Rule 12. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is High) (0.4)          
Rule 13. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)           
Rule 14. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Normal) then (output1 
is Medium) (0.4)     
Rule 15. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then (output1 
is High) (0.4)    
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Rule 16. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)        
Rule 17. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Normal) then (output1 
is Medium) (0.4)  
Rule 18. If (Amount is Normal) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)            
Rule 19. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) 
then (output1 is Medium) (0.4) 
Rule 20. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Normal) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)        
Rule 21. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Non-Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is High) (0.4)       
Rule 22. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)        
Rule 23. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Normal) then (output1 
is High) (0.4)    
Rule 24. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Normal) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is High) (0.4) 
Rule 25. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Non-Sensitive) then 
(output1 is Medium) (0.4)     
Rule 26. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Normal) then 
(output1 is High) (0.4) 
Rule 27. If (Amount is Sensitive) and (Currency is Sensitive) and (Account_Type is Sensitive) then 
(output1 is High) (0.4) 
 
Number of Rules: 27 
 
 
Rules for Layer 2 (Details Segment) 
 
There are 81 rules extracted from MATLAB fuzzy set, layer 2 represent details 
segment.  
 
Fuzzy Rules: 
 
Rule 1. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3) 
Rule 2. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3     ) 
Rule 3. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Low) (0.3     ) 
Rule 4. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3) 
Rule 5. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  ) 
Rule 6. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3  ) 
Rule 7. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3   )
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Rule 8. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3 ) 
Rule 9. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3) 
Rule 10. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3  )    
Rule 11. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3    ) 
Rule 12. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Low) (0.3) 
Rule 13. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 14. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  )
   
Rule 15. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3) 
Rule 16. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3     ) 
Rule 17. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 18. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 19. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3    ) 
Rule 20. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3) 
Rule 21. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Low) (0.3) 
Rule 22. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 23. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  )
   
Rule 24. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3) 
Rule 25. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3     ) 
Rule 26. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 27. If (Transaction_Notes is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3    ) 
Rule 28. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3) 
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Rule 29. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3   ) 
Rule 30. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 31. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 32. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 33. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3 ) 
Rule 34. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3   )
  
Rule 35. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 36. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3) 
Rule 37. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 38. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3    ) 
Rule 39. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3    ) 
Rule 40. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 41. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3    ) 
Rule 42. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3    ) 
Rule 43. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 44. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 45. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and (Password_Tries 
is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 46. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 47. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Low) 
(0.3) 
Rule 48. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Low) (0.3) 
Rule 49. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 50. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  )
   
Rule 51. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3    ) 
Rule 52. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3     ) 
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Rule 53. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 54. If (Transaction_Notes is Normal) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 55. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3    ) 
Rule 56. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3) 
Rule 57. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3     ) 
Rule 58. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3    ) 
Rule 59. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 60. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3) 
Rule 61. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3 ) 
Rule 62. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3    ) 
Rule 63. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3    ) 
Rule 64. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3     ) 
Rule 65. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3 ) 
Rule 66. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 67. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 68. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 69. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3 ) 
Rule 70. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3   )
  
Rule 71. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 72. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Normal) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3) 
Rule 73. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Medium) (0.3     ) 
Rule 74. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3 ) 
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Rule 75. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Non-Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is 
Low) (0.3    ) 
Rule 76. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 )
     
Rule 77. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 78. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Normal) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) 
(0.3 ) 
Rule 79. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3   )
  
Rule 80. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 )
     
Rule 81. If (Transaction_Notes is Sensitive) and (Destination_Profile_ID is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Password_Tries is Sensitive) and (Destination_Account_Tries is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) 
(0.3) 
 
Number of Rules: 81 
 
 
Rules for Layer 3 (Environment Segment) 
 
There are 27 rules extracted from MATLAB fuzzy set, layer 3 represent 
environment segment.  
 
Fuzzy Rules: 
 
Rule 1. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site 
is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3   ) 
Rule 2. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site 
is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3) 
Rule 3. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site 
is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3     ) 
Rule 4. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site is 
Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3    ) 
Rule 5. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site is 
Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3   ) 
Rule 6. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site is 
Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3  ) 
Rule 7. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site is 
Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3   ) 
Rule 8. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site is 
Normal) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
Rule 9. If (Daily_Transactions is Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site is 
Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3     ) 
Rule 10. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site 
is Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) (0.3  ) 
Rule 11. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site 
is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  ) 
Rule 12. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site 
is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
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Rule 13. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site is 
Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) (0.3   ) 
Rule 14. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site is 
Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3   ) 
Rule 15. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site is 
Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3    ) 
Rule 16. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site is 
Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3   ) 
Rule 17. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site is 
Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3) 
Rule 18. If (Daily_Transactions is Normal) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and (Time_On_Site is 
Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3 ) 
Rule 19. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Time_On_Site is Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) (0.3 ) 
Rule 20. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Time_On_Site is Normal) then (output1 is Low) (0.3    ) 
Rule 21. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Non-Sensitive) and 
(Time_On_Site is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3) 
Rule 22. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site 
is Sensitive) then (output1 is Low) (0.3  ) 
Rule 23. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site 
is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  ) 
Rule 24. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Normal) and (Time_On_Site 
is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3 ) 
Rule 25. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and 
(Time_On_Site is Sensitive) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3  ) 
Rule 26. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and 
(Time_On_Site is Normal) then (output1 is Medium) (0.3     ) 
Rule 27. If (Daily_Transactions is Non-Sensitive) and (Transaction_Time is Sensitive) and 
(Time_On_Site is Non-Sensitive) then (output1 is High) (0.3) 
 
Number of Rules: 27 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample extracted data used in experiments 
 
Sample of data used in our real evaluation experiments. Data is extracted from the 
internet banking system used in Jordan Ahli Bank. Data reflects a specific period of 
time. 
  Sample extracted data for Layer 1 (before and after mapping) 
 
Table B-1: extracted data to be processed for layer 1 (before mapping) 
Account_C
urrency 
TO_Account
_Currency 
Transactio
n ID 
Transaction
_Amount 
Transaction_
Currency 
Same/To 
Same 
Curr 
02 01 123456 122.22 USD No 
01 01 61520 100 JOD Yes 
01 01 61653 210 JOD Yes 
01 01 62559 104 JOD Yes 
01 01 62612 300 JOD Yes 
01 02 62706 800 JOD No 
01 01 62782 50 JOD Yes 
01 01 62937 7550 JOD Yes 
01 01 47307 100 JOD Yes 
01 01 63873 1.725 JOD Yes 
01 01 72931 80 JOD Yes 
01 01 73210 303 JOD Yes 
01 02 73355 1455 JOD No 
01 01 73891 30 JOD Yes 
01 01 73925 20000 JOD Yes 
01 01 74112 250 JOD Yes 
01 01 74820 100 JOD Yes 
01 01 75153 245 JOD Yes 
03 01 75812 100 EUR No 
01 01 75973 125 JOD Yes 
01 01 76096 1000 JOD Yes 
01 01 76175 60 JOD Yes 
01 02 76286 500 JOD No 
01 02 76296 450 JOD No 
01 01 76350 10000 JOD Yes 
01 01 77327 110 JOD Yes 
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Table B-2: extracted data for layer 1 (after mapping) 
Transaction 
Amount 
Transaction 
Currency 
Account Type Account Layer  
Importance Level 
Rate 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Normal Normal Sensitive Medium 
Normal Normal Normal Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Normal Medium 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Low 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Normal High 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Normal High 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive High 
Sensitive Normal Normal Medium 
 
  Sample extracted data for Layer 2 (before and after mapping) 
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Table B-3: extracted data for layer 2 (before mapping) 
Transac
tion ID 
Account
_Type 
Transaction_
CODE 
Destination
_ProfileID 
Destination_Ac
count_Tries 
Incorrect_Pass
word_Tries 
123456 002 00 962002 3 0 
61520 001 00 962001 3 0 
61653 002 00 962002 1 0 
62559 001 00 962001 2 1 
62612 001 00 962001 2 1 
62706 001 00 962001 2 1 
62782 001 00 962001 2 1 
62937 002 00 962002 2 0 
47307 001 00 962001 2 0 
63873 001 00 962001 2 0 
72931 003 02 962001 2 0 
73210 001 00 962001 2 0 
73355 001 00 962001 2 0 
73891 001 00 962001 2 0 
73925 001 00 962001 2 0 
74112 001 00 962001 2 0 
74820 001 00 962001 2 0 
75153 001 00 962001 2 0 
75812 001 00 962001 2 0 
75973 001 00 962001 2 0 
76096 001 00 962001 2 0 
76175 001 00 962001 1 0 
76286 002 00 962002 1 0 
76296 002 00 962002 1 0 
76350 001 00 962001 1 0 
77327 001 00 962001 3 0 
 
Table B-4: extracted data for layer 2 (after mapping) 
Transaction 
Notes 
Profile ID Account Tries Incorrect 
Password Tries 
Details Layer 
Importance 
Level Rate 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Non- Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
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Sensitive 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive Normal High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Non-
Sensitive 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Normal Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive Normal High 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Medium 
Non-
Sensitive 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Normal Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Medium 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Normal Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
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Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Sensitive Normal Normal High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-
Sensitive 
Normal Sensitive Sensitive High 
 
Table B-5: extracted data for layer 3 (before mapping) 
Transaction 
ID 
Sequence_NO Posting_Time Logged_IP 
123456 01 7:07:50 128.100.22.121 
61520 01 8:46:37 77.241.64.34 
61653 01 9:54:20 77.245.0.12 
62559 01 9:57:21 79.134.128.64 
62612 01 10:05:44 79.173.192.11 
62706 01 10:11:11 80.64.208.112 
62782 01 10:24:06 80.90.160.93.1 
62937 01 10:33:02 80.249.208.108.6 
47307 01 11:47:16 81.28.112.124.1 
63873 01 7:58:08 82.212.64.139.6 
72931 01 9:00:46 84.18.32.155.1 
73210 01 9:15:45 84.18.64.170.6 
73355 01 10:07:49 86.108.0.186.1 
73891 01 10:09:59 91.186.224.201.6 
73925 01 10:32:11 92.62.112.217.1 
74112 01 12:14:24 92.241.32.232.6 
74820 01 1:05:35 94.142.32.248.1 
75153 01 2:46:01 94.249.0.263.6 
75812 01 3:25:49 95.140.160.75 
75973 01 3:40:17 95.141.208.43 
76096 01 3:54:27 95.172.192.32 
76175 01 4:11:19 188.123.128.112 
76286 01 4:12:27 188.123.160.90.5 
76296 01 4:18:45 188.244.96.100.5 
76350 01 12:19:27 188.247.64.110.5 
77327 01 7:25:19 193.188.64.120.5 
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Table B-6: extracted data for layer 3 (after mapping) 
Time on Service Daily 
Transactions 
Transaction 
Time 
Environment Layer 
Importance Level Rate 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Normal Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal High 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Sensitive Normal Normal Medium 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive High 
Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Medium 
Non-Sensitive Normal Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive Medium 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Sensitive Normal Sensitive High 
Normal Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive Sensitive Medium 
Non-Sensitive Sensitive Non-Sensitive Low 
Normal Non-Sensitive Normal Medium 
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Appendix C 
 
Sample XML messages and sample DTDs  
  Sample Source XML Messages 
<?xml version='1.0'?> 
<Transfers> 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="000"> 
 <Transaction_Notes>002</Transaction_Notes> 
 <Profile_ID>92</Profile_ID> 
 <AccountTries>02</AccountTries> 
 <PasswordTries>01</PasswordTries> 
</Transaction> 
 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="000"> 
 <Posting_Date>2011/01/07</Posting_Date> 
 <Service_ID>WWW60</Service_ID> 
 <Customer_Language>E</Customer_Language> 
</Transaction> 
 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="002"> 
 <TransactionAmount>755</TransactionAmount> 
 <Transaction_Currency Code='JOD'>001</Transaction_Currency> 
 <Account_Type Code='001'>Individual</Account_Type> 
</Transaction> 
 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="001"> 
 <IPAddress>128.200.3.212</IPAddress> 
 <From_Account>390230101401043000</From_Account> 
 <To_Account>120130101155414000</To_Account> 
</Transaction> 
 
</Transfers> 
 
 Sample Encrypted XML Messages 
<?xml version='1.0'?> 
<Transfers> 
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<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="Low"> 
 <Transaction_Notes>002</Transaction_Notes> 
 <Profile_ID>92</Profile_ID> 
 <AccountTries>02</AccountTries> 
 <PasswordTries>01</PasswordTries> 
</Transaction> 
 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="Low"> 
 <Posting_Date>2011/01/07</Posting_Date> 
 <Service_ID>WWW60</Service_ID> 
 <Customer_Language>E</Customer_Language> 
</Transaction> 
 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="Medium"> 
<EncryptedData Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element' 
 xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'>  
<CipherData> 
<CipherValue>i66xTe5hmF/siLFCXDPXTucE9wJZFd 
pbSV3yYwN7pBZKIOTdRdD6LtOgunRVgjxKirSWpLx0yZ3l 
0KoZS9B1gKOalZUjE8Sp8Al8qKgrxbfx3CR7fIdEKPdO47t6hr
swwL7lewxZnrJo5Whd2kw/XRUb 
uXp268jX5dL0dlUDOEqdtgfPUXxROUetbLP1AmtO8riJWVh/
Qyd3pvVZtNOn9mo0CbclDn0UsntXHFEfst8= 
</CipherValue> 
</CipherData> 
</EncryptedData> 
</Transaction> 
 
<Transaction xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2' ImportanceLevel="High"> 
<EncryptedData Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element' 
xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'>  
<CipherData> 
<CipherValue>6N28UemsjUz4vegVtDE1wNNgNkvTvC6Pxi9k2vcHcG
IhSeH+kUIdd2IWvb/62gepoBCDhFGI+XQ9 
DWGvHlebDHA7DgNjmm+D37lU1DuzsB094b8cUPZH9gCjX0VDRn
tfDTFyeiUtLUKIdH1vUi/m+ok/ 
pxnBFo35XheoJQFcLv21Kxz7Tzffh9ZCaqYU8HBE 
</CipherValue> 
</CipherData> 
</EncryptedData> 
</Transaction> 
 
</Transfers> 
